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Marxism Today

EDITORIAL COMMENTS

ANDREW ROTHSTEIN — 1917: THE SOCIALIST REVOLUTION

BERT PEARCE — THE NATIONAL FUTURE OF SCOTLAND AND WALES

DISCUSSION:

PHIL GOODWIN — THE FUTURE OF BRITISH TRANSPORT

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Marxism Today

Vol. 11 No. 11

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Editorial Comments

THE "great debate" on the Common Market is far from lively, for the Labour Government has induced the movement to wait and see what the terms are. Such debate as there is, however, is strongly against the Market.

Mr. Douglas Jay, writing in the *Guardian* (September 18th to 21st) reaffirmed his estimate that entry into the Market would worsen Britain's balance of payments by anything from £600 million to £1,000 million a year. This is surely one of the most amazing aspects of the Common Market campaign. Since 1964 the Government has been trying to wipe out the deficit on Britain's balance of payments. It has cut the deficit enormously, but there will still be a deficit by the end of the year.

Yet the same Government is seriously proposing to enter the Market in the full knowledge that this would create a huge deficit amounting to at least £600 million.

A Fabian Society pamphlet *Europe: Problems of Negotiation* by Geoffrey Robinson (Fabian Society, 4s. 6d.) makes the same point. Mr. Robinson says that

> "entry into an expanded EEC is almost certain to accelerate the trend in British trade towards the highly developed markets of an enlarged European Economic Community and North America. There exists therefore the prospect of acceleration in the break-up of the sterling area, which would impose heavy strains on Britain's capacity to meet substantial drawings. For although it is true that Britain's long-term assets are more than equal to the task, it is inconceivable that any Government would in peacetime forcibly liquidate them."

Mr. Robinson thinks that the only way that Britain could escape from this situation would be for it to raise a low interest loan from the states in the Common Market or that there would be a reform of the international monetary system in which Britain would be enabled to fund its sterling balances. Thus whatever way we look at it entry into the Common Market would worsen Britain's international financial position, and compel it to hold out its begging bowl, either to the Americans or the capitalist powers in the Common Market.

Mr. Jay dealt with the argument that maybe the economic advantages of the Common Market are not very great, but the political advantages were by saying that Britain's entry might widen the split between East and West in Europe and that, in any case, a state in chronic balance of payment difficulties could exert no pressures of a progressive character inside the Common Market. These propositions have long been stressed in the literature of the Communist Party. Now they are receiving wider support from those who are studying the question. The problem is to get them understood in a broad way by large numbers of people.

Those Taxes Again

We have frequently exposed the contention that British big business is staggering under the weight of constantly increasing taxation. In fact, one of the amazing features of the recent period, is the extent to which the companies by means of investment allowances and investment grants, are being relieved from taxation. These are the basic facts to be found in *National Income and Expenditure 1967*.

The gross trading profits of the companies rose from £2,949 million in 1956 to £4,646 million in 1966. One would expect that the amount of taxation paid would increase more or less proportionately, but one would be wrong.

The taxes and national insurance contributions paid by the companies were £800 million in 1956 and only £564 million in 1966. This is because investment allowances and investment grants, etc., have greatly reduced the taxes paid by the companies.

The opposite trend is visible with regard to wages and salaries. Income from employment (wages and salaries plus employers' contributions) rose from £12,262 million in 1956 to £22,437 million in 1966 and income tax on wages and salaries rose from £740 million to £2,192 million in the same period. No wonder the workers grumble about mounting taxation, but they should not think the companies for which they work are in the same boat. On the contrary, Tory and Labour Governments alike are helping to reduce their taxation.

Bankrupt Steel

Steel has been nationalised, and is in process of reorganisation. It is just as well at the outset to put on record that this is the least profitable industry in the whole of the British economy.

Here are some of the companies which have been taken over. The number in brackets indicates their place in the ladder of the 300 largest British companies.

To appreciate their percentage earnings one should remember that the average in British industry is around 15 per cent.

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Company and Rating	*Percentage Profit on Capital, 1967*
Steel Company of Wales (22)	4.2
United Steel (27)	5.7
Colvilles (28)	1.2
Stewart and Lloyds (32)	7.7
Dorman, Longs (54)	2.2
John Summers (60)	8.6
South Durham (74)	5.3
Consett Iron (114)	4.0
Lancashire Steel (130)	Nil

Remember these figures when the Tories start complaining that nationalisation is not paying.

TUC and Public Schools

The General Council of the TUC is frequently called upon to state its views to Commissions set up by the Labour Government, which are unfortunately not always available to the rank and file of the movement, who do not normally see the report of the Trades Union Congress. This is a pity for the General Council's evidence to the Public Schools Commission contained in their report to the Brighton TUC contains some remarks on the public schools system which probably go very much further than the Wilson Government would like to go. We like the Council's description of the object of public schools education:

> "It is designed to equip its recipients to take their places in an occupationally and socially privileged élite. The public schools exist to provide it; their staffs are concerned to assist in imparting it; their pupils attend because their parents wish them to acquire it. It flourishes because the well established connections between the public schools and the ancient English universities, the public services, certain professions and some sectors of business management enable educational privilege to be translated, with a reasonable degree of certainty into occupational and social privileges. . . . These aspects of the functioning of the public schools seem to the General Council to be fundamental to their existence."

The Council sees no useful purpose in continuing or reforming the public schools . . .

> "Since it is those essential characteristics, however, which in the General Council's opinion, render the public schools socially unacceptable and are responsible for their pernicious effects on the educational system, changes which left the nature of the public schools substantially unaffected would, in the General Council's view, be futile. . . . The General Council thus believes that public school education, inseparably related as it must be to the perpetuation of occupational and social privilege, is socially undesirable, as well as damaging in its effects on the public educational system."

We wish all trade unionists in the Labour Party would be as blunt and uncompromising as this.

The NLF Programme

In the middle of August, an Extraordinary Congress of the South Vietnam National Front for Liberation was held in Vietnam to draw up a revised version of its Political Programme. The National Front for Liberation was first set up in December 1960. Its original programme covered ten main points, dealing with the question of the national democratic coalition government which was to take the place of the "disguised colonial regime of the US imperialists" in Saigon; the development of democracy; independent economy and better living standards; land reform; education and culture; the armed forces; rights for national minorities, and women's rights; foreign policy; relations between the two zones; war and peace.

The new programme is much more detailed, and elaborates more fully many of the ideas in the original programme. It is in four main sections:

(1) Unite the entire people, fight the US aggressors, save the country;
(2) Build an independent, democratic, peaceful, neutral and prosperous South Vietnam;
(3) Restore normal relations between North and South Vietnam, proceed towards peaceful reunification of the Fatherland; and
(4) Apply a Foreign Policy of Peace and Neutrality.

In its introductory section, after explaining the successes achieved by the Front, it explains the purpose of the new programme in these terms:

> "At this juncture, in a spirit of developing the former programme, the South Vietnam National Front for Liberation has worked out this political programme with a view to further broadening the bloc of great national union, encouraging and stimulating the entire people to advance, resolved to fight and defeat the US aggressors, and to build an independent, democratic, peaceful, neutral and prosperous South Vietnam."

Proposals—Political and Economic

The Front "stands for uniting all social strata and classes, all nationalities, all political parties, all organisations, all religious communities, all patriotic personalities, all individuals and all patriotic and progressive forces, irrespective of political tendencies" in the struggle against US imperialism and its puppets.

In keeping with this broad approach, the programme sets out a series of aims which are not socialist but directed to meeting the democratic aspirations of all patriotic sections of the people.

Section two is particularly important in this respect. It proposes free general elections, based on universal, equal, direct suffrage and secret ballot; and the setting up of "a national union democratic govern-

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ment including the most representative persons among the various social strata, nationalities, religious communities, patriotic and democratic parties, patriotic personalities, and forces which have contributed to the cause of national liberation". Democratic rights are specified—freedom of speech, press and publication, assembly, trade unions, association, demonstration, and freedom to form political parties. Other rights and freedoms are also laid down.

The economic proposals are aimed at abolishing US monopoly, domination, and building an independent economy. Property of the US imperialists and their agents will be confiscated by the State, but generally speaking "the right to ownership of the means of production" will be protected. The State "will encourage the capitalists in industry and trade to help develop industry, small industries and handicrafts". At the same time, it will "guarantee to the workers and employees the right to take part in the management of enterprises". The land of "the US imperialists and the die-hard cruel landlords" will be confiscated, and land will be given free to the tillers. But other landlords will receive payment for their lands, the rights to ownership of land by churches, pagodas and religious sects will be respected, and owners of plantations growing industrial crops or fruit will be encouraged to carry on.

This makes it quite clear that the programme does not envisage the introduction in South Vietnam of a socialist economy, such as exists in the North, but of an independent economy with an important capitalist sector, operating under the control of a genuinely democratic State.

To safeguard the conditions of the people, the Programme provides for steps to abolish illiteracy, build more schools, reduce school fees, exempt poor students from paying fees at all or grant them scholarships, develop the health services, introduce the 8-hour day and a system of social security.

The series of democratic reforms envisaged in this Programme will surely commend themselves to anyone in Britain except the most die-hard backwoodsmen.

North and South

The treatment in the Programme of relations between North and South Vietnam is also very interesting. After emphasising that "Vietnam is one" and that "Vietnam must be reunified", the Programme takes a very realistic and flexible position regarding the steps towards such reunification, which it envisages will be realised "step by step and through peaceful means on the principle of negotiation between the two zones without either side using pressure against the other and without foreign interference".

Finally, in its fourth section, the Programme declares in favour of "a foreign policy of peace and neutrality", which provides for South Vietnam "to join no military alliance, to accept no military personnel or military base of foreign countries on South Vietnam territory".

Coming at this decisive stage in the war and in the midst of a mounting movement in Britain for an end to British Government backing for the US aggression in Vietnam (as shown by the voting on the resolutions on Vietnam at the TUC, the Labour Party Conference and the Liberal Party Conference), the Programme of the South Vietnam National Front for Liberation can help to spread greater understanding of the issues involved in the war.[1]

OLAS 1967

At the beginning of August, the Organisation of Latin American Solidarity (OLAS) held its first general meeting in Havana, the first *regional* conference to follow from the Tri-Continental Conference (Asia, Africa and Latin America) which took place also in Havana in January 1966. Its purpose, as expressed in the General Declaration unanimously adopted by the delegates at the end of the Conference, was: ". . . to discuss, organise and advance revolutionary solidarity, exchange experiences, co-ordinate their activities on an ideologically firm basis and, in the light of what their revolutionary past and the present conditions have taught them, confront the global counter-revolutionary strategy of imperialism and the national oligarchies."

Delegations representing a wide range of political and revolutionary organisations from 27 Latin American countries (in most cases including the Communist Parties) took part in eleven days of discussion and debate, endeavouring to hammer out the answers to important questions such as the role of the different classes in the Latin American revolution, the character of the revolution, the role of revolutionary organisations, the relation between armed struggle and other forms, the assessment of problems which are common to all the Latin American countries and problems which are peculiar to one country or area, and the linking of the struggles in Latin America to those in Vietnam and elsewhere.

On the necessity for the defeat of US imperialism in Latin America there was unqualified unanimity, a unanimity which must be shared by all democratic people who know the black record of imperialism in that semi-continent.

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[1] The Programme has been reproduced in full by the British-Vietnam Committee. Copies are available from them, price free, but please send stamps to cover postage, at 25a Abbey Gardens, London, N.W.8.

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Latin American Revolution

The Declaration ends with a 20-point Proclamation which sums up what the delegates considered were the main tasks of the Latin American revolution. These 20 points include the following principal ideas:

> The character of the Revolution is the struggle for national independence, for emancipation from the oligarchies, and for taking the socialist road to its complete economic and social development.
>
> The principles of Marxism-Leninism guide the revolutionary movement of Latin America.
>
> The armed revolutionary struggle constitutes the fundamental course of the Revolution in Latin America.
>
> All other forms of struggle must serve to advance and not retard the development of this fundamental course, which is armed struggle.
>
> For the majority of the countries of the Latin American continent, the problems of organising, initiating, developing and completing the armed struggle now constitute the immediate and fundamental task of the revolutionary movement.
>
> Those countries where this task is not the present immediate problem must nevertheless consider it as a future probability in the development of their revolutionary struggle.
>
> The responsibility of furthering the revolution in each country belongs to the people and their revolutionary vanguards.
>
> In most countries the guerrillas are the embryo of liberation armies, and constitute the most efficient way of initiating and carrying out revolutionary struggle.
>
> The leadership of the revolution requires the existence of a unified political and military command.
>
> The Cuban Revolution constitutes the vanguard of the anti-imperialist movement in Latin America. Others will join this vanguard as they advance along the road of armed struggle.

In this first meeting of its kind and given the variety of conditions in the different countries represented, as well as the differing stages of development reached in each country, it is understandable that there should have been the most searching and intense debate on how best to learn from experience in order to utilise the most effective forms of struggle to defeat US imperialism and its supporters in Latin America.

We hope to examine more fully in the forthcoming edition of *Marxism Today* the whole range of problems now opening up in Latin America.

The appalling conditions of poverty and misery in which the vast majority of Latin American people live obviously demand a thoroughgoing revolution. The conflict will be fought out by the peoples of each country, under the leadership of progressive forces which will decide for themselves and use the most appropriate and effective forms for launching the massive struggle against US imperialism.

Imperialism and Oil

The aftermath of the military conflict last June between Israel and the Arab states is not only the serious worsening of relations between these countries, but also the sharper opposition of the Arab states to the imperialist scramble for oil resources and profits in the Middle East.

During the military conflict Algeria put all foreign oil companies under State control, and after the conflict (on August 30th) nationalised 5 foreign oil firms, 4 American and 1 French. Three months before the conflict began Syria succeeded in raising by 50 per cent the level of payments for the transit of oil from Iraq through the Syrian pipeline.

After the conflict also, even Libya, though ruled by a reactionary monarch (King Idris) demanded an increased royalty of more than 30 per cent, and all oil-producing Arab states are now waging the battle for increased royalties.

An extremely useful survey of the political impact of the imperialist scramble for oil in the Middle East is given in the September-October issue of the *International Affairs Bulletin* (Volume II, Number Two) produced by the International Department of the Communist Party.

It reveals with striking clarity that the real conflict in the Middle East is not between Arabs and Jews, but the economic and strategic aims of imperialism, which threaten both Arabs and Jews. The main imperialist aim is to exploit the vast oil resources of this region and to resist the advance of the Arab liberation movement.

To achieve this aim the imperialists are striving to build up Israel as their bridgehead against Arab liberation, and are prepared to use every device to foment conflicts between Arabs and Jews.

This informative Bulletin (20 duplicated pages, price 2s., post free), gives a revealing picture of the whole scramble for oil in the Middle East, and provides invaluable facts to arm all those anxious for a lasting solution between Israel and the Arab states.

Co-ops and Reorganisation

Fighting modern monopolies is a strenuous matter from any point of view. The Trade Union movement is able to use its own weapons and choose its own ground to some extent. The Consumers' Co-operative Movement, however, has to fight

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them on their own ground and beat them at their own game. This means selling better goods at lower prices; the movement must value, but must not trade on, the loyalty of its members.

There are all sorts of economies achieved by increasing the size of the organisation in retail trade, such as bulk buying, economic use of transport, and scores of others.

Way back in 1953 the "Independent Commission" advised reduction of the number of retail societies from 800 to 250-300. So intense has the competition with the monopolies become, however, that, following the reorganisation of the Co-operative Wholesale Society, the target has been altered to not more than 50 or so really large "Regional" retail societies; and the idea has been accepted, formally at any rate, by the movement as a whole.

But not everyone is convinced: many societies will fight sincere but misguided battles for "local independence" forgetting that they are engaged in a life and death struggle.

A clear statement of the case for regional societies is therefore welcome: it is to be found in the Fabian Research pamphlet 260 (*Towards Regional Co-operatives*, (2s. 6d.) by Lloyd Harrison, Managing Secretary of the modern-minded Nottingham society and John Roper, Lecturer in Economics at Manchester University. It should be read by every active co-operator.

The general arguments are put extremely well: the authors are confident that big societies need not mean the death of democracy and members' control; but they recognise the problem and make sensible suggestions for solving it, with district committees, and perhaps members' organisations linked more closely with the shops.

One would, however, have liked a more detailed treatment of the need to bring the employees into the efforts to reinvigorate the movement. They are organised in a powerful and progressive union; and it is known that USDAW understands the importance of the task, and is anxious to help. This is one of the most promising lines of advance, and must be the subject of some hard thinking.

Also, the pamphlet focuses its attention exclusively on the retail movement. True, this is the main form of co-operation in Britain; but there is also a progressive and growing agricultural co-operative movement which should be brought into much closer business relations with the retails. This is something that should be on the agenda of the new regional societies. The retails want reliable supplies of high quality home produced foodstuffs, including "fruit and veg", which is not their strong point at the moment. The producers want reliable and expanding markets. The case for a marriage is overwhelming.

Scholarship in Blinkers

When the International Printing Exhibition (IPEX) was held in London four years ago it was accompanied by a remarkable display of books—some 400-odd—under the title "Printing and the Mind of Man". The display was organised under the most erudite auspices (including the British Museum) and a handsome catalogue printed by the Oxford University Press.

Among the books displayed there were three Marxist classics, the *Communist Manifesto*, the first volume of *Capital* and Lenin's *What is to be Done?* A fair selection, it may be conceded; but the annotations were of a degree of illiteracy and absurdity that Allen Hutt was moved to protest to the sponsors in a detailed memorandum. As a result he was asked to contribute the more detailed annotations for these three entries to the greatly enlarged, indeed sumptuous, version of the catalogue published this year by Cassells: an imposing Cambridge-printed folio priced at seven guineas. The volume was edited by two notable bibliographical authorities, John Carter and Percy H. Muir.

Allen Hutt recounts with some amusement how, even after his commissioning to prepare the new Marxist annotations, he had a stiff fight at proof stage to prevent the preposterous insertion into his contributions of the very illiteracies and inaccuracies that he had initially protested against. He notes, further, how the editors appeared unable to get the title of Engels' *Condition of the Working Class in England* right (this appears as a plural, "Conditions" and "Working Classes", though Hutt drily pointed out that it was only necessary to consult the British Museum catalogue).

As an example of a cavalier approach to established texts, strange for scholars of the reputation of Messrs. Carter and Muir, Hutt also notes the change in the authorised translation of the *Manifesto* of "Workingmen of All Countries, Unite!" to the common, but not textual, version "Workers of the World, Unite!"

These, however, are small beer compared with the bizarre entry for Gobineau's rabidly racialist *Essai sur l'Inégalité des Races Humaines* (1853-55). Incredibly this entry asserts that Lenin was "at one remove" one of the "disciples and propagandists" of the notorious Frenchman whose diseased notions are well known to have been drawn on by Hitler and the Nazis for the "Herrenvolk" monstrosity.

The supposed demonstration of this rubbish is fascinating as an example of plain ga-ga masquerading as scholarship. For the "remove" appears to be Georges Sorel, the French anarcho-syndicalist theoretician of the early years of the century, improbably presented here as one of Gobineau's "apostles" (for which there is no evidence at all;

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nor in the last 50 years has anyone suggested it). Having thus linked Gobineau with Sorel it is only necessary to link Sorel with Lenin and hey, presto, Lenin is a racialist. The last link is produced by the assertion that Sorel was "the most influential single theoretical teacher" of Lenin (apparently on the quaint basis that Sorel's cloudy "social myth" theories influenced Mussolini).

Of course, Sorel's mish-mash of Bakunin and Bergson had as little influence on Lenin or any other Marxist as Bakunin himself had on Marx. Unless the contributor of the Gobineau item wishes to argue, on the Bacon-Shakespeare basis, that Bakunin really wrote Marx.

In *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* Lenin dismissed Sorel as "the notorious muddler" and at the end of the exhaustive bibliography of Marxism he appended to his famous 1914 article on Marx for *Granat's Encyclopaedia* he merely listed Sorel as one of three critics of Marx "from the point of view of Anarchism". Hardly a reference to an "influential theoretical teacher".

The reader may well ask why scholarship should be so blinkered that such a tissue of ludicrous absurdities is allowed to appear in a work of supposed learning. It contrasts strangely with the editors' stress on what they call their "perfectionist exigence". No wonder heavy critical broadsides have come from *The Times Literary Supplement* ("many misleading statements") and Sir Denis Brogan in *The Spectator* ("the insularity of choice and comments is quite paralysing . . . startling omissions").

The Impact of the Russian Revolution in Britain

The fact that fifty years have now passed since the Russian Revolution automatically means that the hitherto secret files of the British Cabinet of the time have this year at length become open to public inspection. The Cabinet Minutes of 1917 constitute one of the sources on which Robin Page Arnot has drawn in preparing the anniversary book published on November 2nd by Lawrence and Wishart—*The Impact of the Russian Revolution in Britain* (45s.). Other sources include the press and the public utterances of politicians.

For the story of what happened during the momentous days of November 1917 in Russia itself readers will always turn to John Reed's eye-witness account in *Ten Days that Shook the World* (first published by the Communist Party of Great Britain in 1926, now available in hardback from Lawrence and Wishart at 18s. and as a Penguin). Robin Page Arnot was himself a very active member of the left wing of the Labour Movement at that time, so that his account of the effects wrought in Britain is no mere product of research into the archives but incorporates his own living experience.

This is a very fascinating book, showing the reactions in Britain to the great Revolution from the moment when the first news of the abdication of the Tsar "came like a bolt from the blue" up to the conclusion (and from the capitalist point of view abject failure) of the wars of intervention. The Russians went ahead to start building the world's first socialist society, and in Britain there had been laid the firm and lasting foundations of the Communist Party.

Aims and Methods of Soviet Planning

A second book published simultaneously by Lawrence and Wishart deals with the highly developed methods of economic planning practised in the Soviet Union today. This is *Aims and Methods of Soviet Planning*, by Mikhail Bor (50s.). It was prepared by an eminent Russian planning economist specially for English readers.

Economic planning has become a highly specialised and very intricate science. This is not an easy book, therefore, but it is an extremely instructive and informative one. The author does not dwell so much on the successes of the Soviet economy as explain in detail the methods of planning by which those successes are attained. And in this he deals too with failures and shows how improved methods have been evolved out of the lessons of mistakes. At the beginning he shows how an economic plan is not simply one single plan, but is worked out by bringing together a whole system of plans—plans for industries, plans for agriculture, plans for individual factories and farms, plans for transport, plans for the regulation of prices, plans to meet various forms of consumer demand, plans for the development of science and technology. All these and others are fitted together into a single working unity of economic activity, aimed at raising the standards of life and satisfying the material and cultural needs of the whole population.

Of very great interest is the final chapter, in which a careful comparison is drawn between the methods of so-called "indicative planning", as now practised in parts of the capitalist world, and socialist planning. We know from our daily experience that capitalist planning does not work, except in so far as freezing wages while prices and unemployment both rise may be said to represent a planned success for state monopoly capitalism. Mikhail Bor explains very clearly why this is so.

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1917: The Socialist Revolution

Andrew Rothstein

1. RUSSIA AFTER TSARDOM

ON April 8th, 1917, after a week in Russia, Lenin's trusted comrade Alexandra Kollontay wrote to him and his wife;[1]

"The people are still intoxicated by the great act. I say the people, because it is not the working class which holds front place but a diffuse and motley mass dressed in soldiers' greatcoats. At present it is the soldier who dictates the mood, the soldier too who is creating a peculiar atmosphere in which the greatness of the vividly expressed democratic liberties, the awakening of consciousness of equal rights for all citizens and complete failure to understand the complexity of the moment, are all mixed up together. Amidst the feverish activity and striving to build something new, different from the past, there is too loud a sound of triumph already attained, as though the cause has been won completely. Not only is the 'internal enemy' underestimated—biding his time, and of course far from finished off—but undoubtedly our people, and particularly the Executive Committee of the Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, lack the *resolution* and *political judgment* for carrying on what has begun, consolidating power in the hands of democracy. 'We are already in power'—that is the complacently mistaken mood of the majority in the Soviet. And of course this intoxication with successes achieved is taken advantage of by the Guchkov[2] Government, bowing hypocritically before the will and decision of the Soviet in minor details, but naturally in the main—and particularly on the question of the war—keeping the 'reins' in its own hands."

"We want an End to this War"

"Particularly on the question of the war": yet on this very question there lurked a deep and decisive division between the vast majority of those in soldiers' greatcoats and the representatives of capitalism who dominated the first Provisional Government. The soldiers were determined that the slaughter in the war with Germany should end. That they had suffered, in all probability, well over 3 million killed already, was the British military attaché's estimate: and he did not conceal the terrifying figures of the Russian Army's lack of weapons, compared with that of their allies—1 heavy gun to 984 yards, compared with the British 13 and the French 10 per 914 yards.[3] "When they came and told us about the revolution, all the soldiers said: 'Thank God, perhaps there will soon be peace'", said a soldier delegate Ostromoukhov (not a Bolshevik) at the first conference of Soviets in April. He had always followed the speeches of the socialists in the Duma, because they had never talked about war to a victorious conclusion. "My comrades told me, when they were sending me to this conference, that I should tell comrade Chkheidze (the Menshevik leader) and everyone that we are ready to lay down our lives for this liberty: but all the same, comrades, we want an end to this war."[4] In fact, British representatives with the Russian Army knew perfectly well that, on the showing of officers whom they knew, a Russian offensive was now "out of the question"![5] This did not prevent them, and the Ambassador under whom they worked, from exercising every kind of pressure on the "Guchkov" Provisional Government to launch such an offensive.

Capitalists and Landlords

In the background for the moment, for the great mass of those demonstrating their joy in endless

[1] Kollontay had just returned from Norway, one of the first revolutionary emigrants to get back. The letter, reproduced in the Soviet journal *Novy Mir* (April 1967), is in the Central Party Archives at the Institute of Marxism-Leninism.

[2] Big business-man, War Minister in the Provisional Government.

[3] Sir Alfred Knox, *With the Russian Army 1914-1917* (1921), vol. II, pp. 542, 545, 547.

[4] Quoted in *Outlines of the History of the October Revolution*, in Russian, edited by Professor M. N. Pokrovsky, 1927, Vol. II, pp. 149-50: and in Avdeyev—*The Revolution of 1917*, in Russian, 1923, pp. 145-146.

[5] So Knox reported to the Chief of the (British) Imperial General Staff (War Cabinet minutes, April 18th, 1917) supported by Lt.-Col. Blair, assistant military attaché, on April 20th (Cabinet papers GT 760). The conflict over Order No. 1 to the Petrograd garrison, from the Petrograd Soviet, establishing the rights of the Russian soldier, was mentioned in my article in the July *Marxism Today*. I am obliged to the Public Record Office for help in consulting these minutes and papers, which are Crown copyright, and indexed under numbers CAB 23/2, 23/3, and 23/4 and (the papers) GT . . .

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demonstrations to the Petrograd Soviet at the Tavrida Palace—Kollontay in her letter speaks of "schoolboys and laundresses, caretakers and cabdrivers" going there—was the fact that Russia was still in the hands of great capitalists and landowners.

The big banks still controlled 50 per cent of the share capital of the iron and steel industry, 60 per cent of coalmining, 80 per cent of electrical engineering. When the workers introduced the 8-hour day on their own initiative, sanctioned later by the Soviets, and began pressing for wage increases, employers freely answered by lockouts: between March and October 1917 about 1,000 industrial establishments were closed down in this way. The cost of living went on rising, and while evasion of tax obligations by the capitalists was well known, the workers were heavily burdened by indirect taxes and the constant fall in the purchasing power of the rouble.

A few tens of thousands of great landowners owned over 360 million acres, while more than 13½ million poor and middle peasants had under 330 million acres between them (a third of them with no implements and no horse).[6] The French Ambassador noted in his diary on March 20th, after tea with a group of nobles, that their one fear was "division of the land": one of them alone possessed 700,000 acres in Volhynia, in the south-west. But they hoped that only Crown and Church lands—about 220 million acres—would be taken, and that this would satisfy the peasantry.[7]

2. THE FORCES OF "ORDER"

At dinner, the previous evening, with another group of nobles, the Ambassador had been assured that the workers—at most, he was told, 1,200,000 out of 178 millions—"won't always be our masters", and that the "Black Hundreds" would still have their part to play.[8] Similarly Professor S. G. Svatikov, sent round the Russian Embassies abroad to see how the ending of espionage against political exiles was proceeding, reported that the Russian diplomats, "profoundly hating the revolution, use every effort to discredit not only democracy, but the Provisional Government itself."[9] But for the time being these and similar supporters of the old order had to restrain themselves.

Prince Lvov's Provisional Government, however, (in which there was only one professed socialist, Kerensky) only had to proclaim that it was acting on behalf of democracy and in the name of liberty to continue in all essentials upholding capitalism, whose representatives occupied nearly all its Ministerial posts. The most influential among them were "Octobrists"—bourgeois landowners in the main, or their spokesmen, with Guchkov, War Minister, their leader; and "Cadets"—"Constitutional Democrats", chiefly professors and lawyers who hoped for capitalism prosperous and expanding in Russia (and outside it, to Constantinople and Asia Minor): among these Milyukov, the Foreign Minister, was outstanding. He told Paléologue on March 17th: "We are not responsible to the Duma". "You hold your powers from the Revolution?" "No, we received them, we inherited them, from the Grand Duke Michael, who transferred them to us."[10] And while Milyukov and his colleagues had enough sense to keep this "constitutional theory" to themselves, in practice they acted as though it were in force.

Old State Preserved

While dismissing from their public office the great landowners who held the post of Tsarist governors and vice-governors of provinces, they replaced them on March 17th by the corresponding officers of the provincial Zemstvos—who, although now named "Commissars of the Provisional Government", with extremely wide powers, did not thereby cease to be the "presidents of the nobility" of their province.[11]

All the Tsarist public prosecutors were maintained in office—and the archives of the Gendarmerie and the secret police transferred to their care.[12] The Law Committee of the Provisional Government refused to submit legislation which would (a) guarantee equal rights for women in the future Constituent Assembly (b) allow children to be freed from religious instruction in schools (c) allow government employees leave of absence to attend provincial congresses of Soviets, trade unions, etc. It insisted (May 30th) that the Tsar and his family would retain full electoral rights, and (in its draft land decree of July 25th-27th) that the landowners' estates must remain their private property.[13]

It is not surprising that by the summer the Provisional Government had begun sending puni-

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[6] V. Nizhnikov, "Economic Background of the, October Revolution" in Russian (*Voprosy Ekonomiki*, no. 5, 1957).

[7] M. Paléologue, "*La Russie des Tsars*" (1922), vol. 3, p. 257.

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 255.

[9] This extract, from vol. 5 of the archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs published in 1918, is quoted by A. V. Ignatiev, *Russian-British Relations on the Eve of the October Revolution* (in Russian), 1966, p. 152.

[10] Paléologue, *op. cit.*, p. 245.

[11] *Russian Year Book*, 1913 (Eyre and Spottiswoode, London), p. 12.

[12] *Outlines . . . op. cit.*, p. 130.

[13] E. A. Skripylev, "An Institution Hostile to the October Revolution" (in Russian), in the journal *Sovetskoye Gosudarstvo i Pravo*, No. 5, 1967.

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tive expeditions into the countryside to suppress peasant "disturbances" (seizures of land and stock): or that it did not even proclaim Russia a Republic until September 14th, after a rebellion by the would-be military dictator General Kornilov, had been defeated by the workers, sailors and soldiers.

Foreign Policy Continued

Most striking, however, was its stubborn effort to continue the Tsar's foreign policy. Philips Price, correspondent in Russia of the *Manchester Guardian*, found no revolution in the Russian Foreign Office. "The same old Tsarist plans of conquest were being run by officials who had exchanged the watchword 'aristocratic privilege' for 'middle class efficiency'," he wrote.[14] The memoirs of the British and French Ambassadors and their subordinates, the apologies of Kerensky and his agents, give an unanswerable picture of this aspect of the Provisional Government's policy, of the unyielding pressure exerted on it by its Allies—and of the difficulties which this constantly produced, right up to the end.[15] Some account of the main stages in the struggle will be found later.

Without the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries who controlled the Petrograd Soviet, the bourgeoisie would have been powerless: of this both were convinced. On March 22nd Guchkov had replied to General Alexeyev, Chief of the General Staff, who had complained of excessive concessions to the Petrograd Soviet:

> "The Provisional Government does not dispose of any real authority. Its orders are carried out only to the extent permitted by the Soviet, which controls the most important elements of real power, as the troops, railways, posts and telegraphs are in its hands. One can say frankly that the Provisional Government exists only so long as this is tolerated by the Soviet."[16]

Alexeyev accordingly, two days later, sent a confidential circular to all commanders of fronts and armies, instructing them that any orders from the government could come only by agreement with the Soviet, which alone had "real power".[17]

[14] *My Reminiscences of the Russian Revolution*, 1921, p. 19—a book still of abiding value on its subject.

[15] An extremely valuable and unjustly hushed-up study of this, in English, is by an American R. D. Warth, *The Allies and the Russian Revolution*, Cambridge University Press (1954). The new work in Russian by A. V. Ignatiev, already quoted, uses additional material from the archives of the old Foreign Ministry.

[16] *Outlines . . . op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 134.

[17] Quoted by A. M. Andreyev, "The Councils of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies on the Eve of October" (in Russian), 1967, pp. 115-6.

3. THE SOVIETS, MARCH-APRIL

In the Petrograd Soviet the overwhelming majority of deputies were non-Bolsheviks (the Bolsheviks numbered 65 out of over 2,500 at the end of March and 100 a month later): it should not be supposed, however, that most of those who called themselves Mensheviks or Socialist-Revolutionaries really had any knowledge of socialism. At first, writes Philips Price, only active revolutionaries from among the workers and soldiers could be found there:

> "Gradually however other grades of the proletariat began to be drawn into the Soviet system: the small handicraft worker, the half-proletarian peasant, the shop-assistant, the bank clerk type, etc. These imperfectly organised and politically undeveloped proletarian groups allowed themselves to be dominated by persons not strictly of their class . . . These social elements, from the first days of the March Revolution, began to cluster round the Menshevik wing."

Earlier he had been struck by the even more marked process in the Moscow Soviet (where the Bolsheviks had 143 deputies of of 625 by May). He commented on

> "the large number of officers, advocates, middle-class politicians and even small Government officials who were elected . . . Anyone of the free professions and anyone with a University education, who was not known to be a Monarchist, could get into the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. The Menshevik group and the Socialist-Revolutionary Party were literally filled in those days with people who in reality had nothing in common with socialism and the Revolution, and these people acquired a great influence over the provincial Soviets".[18]

The same could be said in essence of the latter.[19]

Thus the Soviets in their first months faithfully reflected that very mixed-up state of mind of the masses which Alexandra Kollantay described in the letter to Lenin. But of course its leaders, the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, had much more definite views of their own. The essence of these was that the job of the bourgeoisie was to govern, and to develop capitalism further, while the job of socialists was to "supervise" the Government and prevent the people going to "extremes".

Contradictory Policies

The mixed-up condition of political immaturity in the classes which in reality had power at their command led, nevertheless, to problems for their

[18] *Op. cit.*, pp. 17-18, 24-25.

[19] Andreyev, *op. cit.*, gives a fully-documented account, based on vast original research into provincial archives, newspapers, etc.

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leaders. Contradictory policies had to be adopted which sometimes played directly into the hands of the bourgeoisie, but sometimes forced the latter to make concessions.

Thus at its very first meeting on March 15th the Provisional Government decided to allow Nicholas II and his family to leave Russia. Next day the EC of the Petrograd Soviet, on the contrary, demanded their arrest. On March 17th Nicholas decided he would go to England, and on the 19th the Government asked for British agreement. But when Kerensky announced the decision at the Moscow Soviet on the 20th, there was an uproar: and on the 21st. at the reiterated demand of the Petrograd Soviet, the ex-Tsar and his wife were arrested. That same day, the British War Cabinet resolved that it would be glad to see the Tsar out of Russia, "but they doubt if Great Britain is the right place" (minute 100)—and Sir George Buchanan, the Ambassador in Petrograd, was told of this.

Fearing direct defiance of the Soviet, Milyukov now informed Buchanan that the plan to send Nicholas abroad had only been postponed; but when the Ambassador began pressing for the earliest possible departure of Nicholas and his family, the Provisional Government had to ask him (April 3rd) not to embarrass them, as rumours about plans to get the Romanovs away were still circulating.[20] Finally, on April 13th, Lloyd George told the War Cabinet that there was strong hostility to Nicholas II here "in certain working class circles", and the South of France would be "a better place" for him. The British Ambassador was to be asked his opinion of this—and thereafter the question was dropped.[21] The workers and soldiers had won.

The War Continued

When it came to the question of continuation of the war, however—and particular of war aims—the majority in the Petrograd Soviet (and, after the first All Russian Congress of Soviets in July, in the Central Executive Committee of Soviets elected there) played a more subtle game, constantly finishing up on the side of the Provisional Government. On March 19th the latter issued manifestoes to the civil population and the Army, proclaiming its determination to carry on the war "to a victorious conclusion" (the previous day its representative in London Nabokov had been informed by Foreign Secretary Balfour that this was an essential condition for recognition, and earlier still, on the 17th, a group of British Labour leaders had cabled Kerensky and Chkheidze in the same sense).[22]

Furthermore, on March 24th Milyukov as Foreign Minister informed the Ambassadors of the Allies that Russia stood for firm observance of the treaties between them, i.e. of the undertakings to dismember the German, Austro-Hungarian and Turkish Empires in one another's favour. The treaties were still secret, but an Allied Note to President Wilson in January had already been described by the British Socialist Party—like other revolutionary socialist parties—as "a programme of conquest" displaying "aggressive ends". On March 27th the Petrograd Soviet also had its say: it issued a manifesto to the peoples of the world calling, on the one hand for an international struggle of the peoples against the "annexationist strivings of the governments of all countries", yet proclaiming, on the other hand, that "the Russian revolution would not retreat before the bayonets of conquerors and would not allow itself to be crushed by external military force".

After the annexationist manifesto of the Provisional Government, this was merely a high-sounding acceptance of continuation of the war (Lenin called it, a fortnight later, "most empty and lying petty-bourgeois chatter").

Taking the cue from this lead, the Provisional Government on April 9th published a new declaration of war aims, saying that it wanted no violent seizure of foreign territories, only "a stable peace on the basis of self determination of peoples ". . . and would "fully observe its obligation to its Allies". Three days later a preliminary All-Russian Conference of Soviets, at which Bolshevik speakers had criticised the declaration, rejected their resolution, and once more endorsed the Provisional Government's statement, by 325 votes to 57 with 20 abstentions.

The Mensheviks

Thus in fact the Menshevik leaders of the Soviet tied the Russian people not only to the policy of the Provisional Government, but to the war aims of Britain, France and Italy.

Their peculiar services to the latter were brought out most clearly by the contrast with the very cold reception given by the Soviets in Petrograd, Moscow and at the front to delegations sent to Russia by the French Socialist and British Labour leaders, when

[20] Avdeyev, *The Revolution of 1917* (Chronicle of Events), in Russian, 1923, pp. 72, 78-9; Ignatiev, *op. cit.*, pp. 173-4.

[21] War Cabinet Minute 118.

[22] From War Cabinet Minute 98 we learn that (i) this had been proposed by the British Ambassador in Petrograd, (ii) Arthur Henderson had submitted a draft, on behalf of the Labour leaders, and (iii) it was the War Cabinet which decided it should be sent.

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they spoke too brutally and openly of carrying on until the destruction of the enemy Empires.

We learn from its minutes (No. 107 of March 28th) that the British War Cabinet was at great pains to secure a suitably composed delegation with "a reliable Russian Socialist being attached as interpreter", and even favoured "the addition of a more academic Socialist of the type of Mr. Hyndman". But the presence with the ultra-jingo delegates—O'Grady, Will Thorne and Sanders—of the renegade Alexinsky in the capacity of reliable Socialist was too much even for the "moderates" in the Soviet; the delegates were castigated everywhere by the rank and file for not demanding democratic peace aims of their own Governments. And it must have been poor consolation for them to be described as "three fine fellows" by General Knox, and "simply admirable" by Professor Bernard Pares, attached to the Russian GHQ.[23]

4. THE BOLSHEVIK PARTY

In earlier articles this year, it was shown how the Bolshevik groups in the largest Petrograd factories and in the armed forces had led the way in the great struggles from 1916 onwards and in the five historic days which brought down Tsardom—only to be submerged, so it seemed, in the resultant great flood which Kollontay described in the letter quoted above, and which Lenin defined as the "giant petty-bourgeois wave", swamping even sections of the workers with petty-bourgeois ideas on politics. Yet from the first the Bolshevik Party had begun its distinctive struggle in the new conditions, swimming against the stream: and on April 16th it received a powerful reinforcement by the return of Lenin.

Everywhere the Bolsheviks began reconstituting their organisation as a legal party directly Tsardom fell: party groups in the factories, travelling organisers ("agents") of the Central Committee, the "Russian Bureau" of the Central Committee (A. G. Shlyapnikov, P. A. Zalutsky and V. M. Molotov) all emerged from illegality, soon reinforced by old members released from prison, Russian exile or emigration abroad. *Pravda* resumed publication on March 18th, and other Bolshevik papers began to appear elsewhere. The Party membership was about 24,000 (over 60 per cent workmen, just over 25 per cent "office workers"—most of these professional revolutionaries who had been working underground—and over 7 per cent peasants).

There were about 2,000 in Petrograd, 600 in Moscow, 500 in the Urals, the rest in other main industrial centres like the Volga towns, the Donetz coalfield, or Kharkov. A certain number of organisations formed in the first weeks of legality in remoter areas like the Caucasus, Siberia or Central Asia, totalling perhaps 14 per cent of the Party, included Mensheviks as well—though a small minority of the latter, as a rule.[24]

Lenin's Line

Lenin, who had fought all through the war for a clean break with every kind of socialist grouping supporting it—or tolerating alliance with such "social-patriots"—foresaw such a development. His first letter to Alexandra Kollontay in Stockholm, written in Zurich on March 16th, underlined: "We remain against defence of the fatherland, against the imperialist slaughter led by Shingaryov" (a leading Cadet) "and Kerensky and Co.", and for "agitation and struggle with the object of an *international* proletarian revolution and the conquest of power by the 'Councils of Workers' Deputies'."

He immediately began working out with Zinoviev the draft of more extended points (they did not see the light until 1924): but in a letter to Kollontay, who had cabled asking for his "directives", Lenin wrote on March 17th that "the most important thing at the moment, in my opinion, is not to let oneself be tied up in stupid attempts at 'unification' with the social-patriots (or, more dangerous still, with waverers like the Organisation Committee"—the internationalist wing of the Mensheviks—"Trotsky and Co."). Evidently fearing that the letter would not (in wartime conditions) reach Kollontay in time, Lenin on March 19th sent a third message—a cable "to Bolsheviks leaving for Russia".[25] It ran:

> "Our tactics: complete distrust, no support for the new Government, we suspect Kerensky in particular, arming of the proletariat the sole guarantee, immediate election to the Petrograd City Council, no rapprochement with other parties. Cable this to Petrograd."

Then, in a series of *Letters from Afar* (March 20th-April 8th), Lenin developed these points in the shape of articles. Only the first of the letters was printed in *Pravda* (March 21st and 22nd): but it emphasised that against the new government, representing "the new class which has risen to political power in Russia, the class of capitalist landowners and bourgeoisie which has long been *ruling* our country in the economic sense", the Council of Workers' Deputies represented "the

[23] *With the Russian Army*, vol. II, p. 616; and *War Cabinet Papers* GT.749.

[24] V. Anikeyev, "Some Questions of Party Building before October" (in Russian), *Kommunist*, No. 7, 1967.

[25] The texts of the letters of March 16th and 17th are in vol. 35 of the English edition of Lenin's *Collected Works*. The cable is printed in vol. 23.

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interests of all the *poorest* masses of the population, i.e. nine-tenths of the people"—and was "the embryo of a Workers' Government".

The Russian Bureau of the CC, in its first public statement after the overthrow of Tsardom on March 17th, called the Provisional Government "in essence counter-revolutionary", and said there could be no agreements with it. But it put forward instead the idea of "a provisional revolutionary government of a democratic character (the dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry)"—without reference to the role of the Soviets. This left unchallenged the possibility of the Soviets themselves becoming the mainstay of the Government by majority decisions, as in fact they did—under cover of the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary plea that they were "exercising pressure" on the Government.

A number of Party meetings of workers went on record, indeed, demanding that the Soviets should take over power. But the insufficiently clear resolutions of the Russian Bureau for a time did make possible in turn the view that "pressure" on the Provisional Government" was a practicable policy, or that unity with at least left Mensheviks was permissible: not to speak of some expressions of what Lenin had called "revolutionary defencism"—notably by Kamenev, who in an article in *Pravda* said Russian soldiers must "answer bullet with bullet, and shell with shell".

The April Theses

However, the great majority of the Party were obviously ill at ease in face of such views, and this became clear at once directly Lenin returned on April 16th and read his famous "April Theses" the following day (published in *Pravda* on the 20th). It should be said that the Bolsheviks had issued the call for organising legal trade unions on a national scale, and hundreds of thousands were being enrolled by the end of March. They had also called for the election of all-in factory committees, which began at great speed, outstripping at first the formation of trade unions—principally in connection with the struggle for an 8-hour day. With this went the formation (mainly on the Bolshevik's initiative) of armed workers' militias,[26] soon numbering tens of thousands in all industrial centres. Thus the Bolshevik Party was well able to judge what at any rate the most active sections of the working class were thinking, by the time Lenin returned.

The details of his April Theses, and of the article which accompanied them, must be studied elsewhere.[27] The outstanding features were (i) that the war remained capitalist and predatory until power had been taken by the proletariat and poorest peasantry (ii) that power was in the hands of the capitalists because of the insufficient class-consciousness of the proletariat who trusted the capitalist Provisional Government (iii) that there should be no support of the latter, only exposure (iv) that the Party, recognising that it was in a minority in most Soviets, should patiently explain to the workers the need for all power to be transferred to those bodies (v) that Russia should become a republic of Soviets (vi) that, though a number of sweeping political, administrative and economic measures ought to be taken—including confiscation of all landowners' estates and nationalisation of all land—the aim must be for the present not the "introduction" of Socialism but "the transition to *control*, by the Council of Workers' Deputies, of social production and distribution of the products of labour".

This programme of theory and practice for the immediate future was treated as madness, if not worse, by the Bolsheviks' rivals in the Soviets. But within three weeks it had won practical unanimity in the Party. After a series of meetings in the wards of Petrograd, a Petrograd City Conference—now representing 15,000 members—approved it by 33 to 6 with 2 abstentions. Other regional organisations did the same by even bigger majorities. At Kiev the district committee had rejected the theses, but a city aggregate meeting reversed the decision.[28] The 7th All-Russian Party Conference on May 7th-12th, 1917 (the 6th had had to be held abroad, at Prague, in January 1912) adopted by immense majorities the main resolutions based on Lenin's theses—on the war and "revolutionary defencism", by 126 with 7 abstentions; on the Provisional Government, by 122 to 3 with 8 abstentions: and on the agrarian question, by 122 with 11 abstentions.[29]

By this time the Party had grown to 80,000 members—16,000 in Petrograd, 7,000 in Moscow, nearly 15,000 in the Urals, 5,000 in the Donetz coalfield. Moreover, there were about 6,000 members in the armed forces.[30]

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[26] Some details are given in the new *History of the October Revolution* (in English) edited by D. N. Sobolev and other members of the Institute of History in Moscow (available from Central Books).

[27] The text is available in vol. 24 of the *Collected Works*. It was first published in this country—with his explanatory "Letter on Tactics"—by the British Socialist Party in January 1920, under the title of *Towards Soviets*.

[28] S. Knyazev, D.Kukin. V. I. Lenin's *April Theses*. *Kommunist*, No. 6, 1967.

[29] *Petrograd City and All-Russian Conferences of the RSDLP (Bolsheviks) in April 1917* (in Russian), 1925.

[30] *Minutes of VI Congress of the RSDLP (Bolsheviks)* (in Russian), 1919, p. 56.

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5. THE STRUGGLE FOR THE MASSES

By this time, too, the working class and the mass of the peasants and soldiers had begun the long process of testing out in real life the pledges of the two sides. What was unique in history was the reflection of the tests, and their results, in the Soviets, by far the most sensitive and representative organ of opinion which the mass of the people have ever possessed anywhere in modern times. It is quite impossible to give more than a summary in this article. Mr. Philips Price's *Reminiscences*, together with the new *History of the October Revolution* published by the Institute of History of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, are still the best general account in English, although there is much valuable material in the *History of the Civil War in the USSR* published in the 'thirties. When and if A. M. Andreyev's book on the Soviets in 1917, mentioned earlier, appears in English, it will be a valuable addition to basic knowledge for the British working class public.

The succession of crises which involved the Provisional Government and the classes supporting it, the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary leadership of the Soviets and the classes supporting them, and the Bolshevik Party with its growing backing from the most class-conscious elements among the industrial workers, the soldiers and the poor peasantry, makes the most convenient framework of events.

The April Crisis and its Consequences

In the second half of March and the first fortnight of April large forces regarded as reliable—two corps and seven separate divisions—were quietly transferred to the Northern front nearest to Petrograd. The forces of reaction were becoming anxious at the fraternisation at the front and growing peace moods in the rear. Paléologue noted in his diary on April 1 that when Kornilov (commanding the Petrograd garrison) held a review that day on the square before the Winter Palace, the soldiers marched under banners calling for "Land and Liberty!", "The Land for the People!", "Hail the Socialist Republic!"—and very few marked "War to Victory!"[31]

On May Day, while the workers and soldiers of Petrograd were marching in a huge demonstration at the call of the Petrograd Soviet, with banners calling for "peace and brotherhood of the peoples", "no annexations or indemnities", Foreign Minister Milyukov, protesting loyalty to "existing obligations" sent a Note to the Allies reaffirming the aim of "war to decisive victory", and insisting on a peace with "guarantees and sanctions".

[31] *Op. cit.*, p. 280.

Publication of the Note on May 3rd brought out soldiers and sailors in big protest demonstrations, later supported by thousands of workers at the call of the Bolshevik Party, demanding Milyukov's resignation. There were scuffles in the city centre, students, military cadets and business men shouting support for the Provisional Government. At a private meeting with leaders of the Provisional Government in Guchkov's house, Kornilov offered to disperse the demonstrations by military force—but the Ministers hesitated, wisely as it turned out.

Strikes and demonstrations continued the whole of the next day, in the course of which several people were shot: and Kornilov telephoned an artillery school ordering two batteries to be brought out on the Palace Square. The soldiers and officers there unanimously refused to carry out the order, and sent to the Soviet to discover whether Kornilov had its approval. Two hours later the general cancelled his order. There were also great demonstrations in Moscow, Kharkov, Minsk and other cities.[32] Meanwhile the Petrograd Soviet leaders, while exhorting revolutionary and military and naval units to keep calm and refrain from sending units to Petrograd unless requested by the Soviet, extracted from the Government an "explanation" to the effect that the Note did not mean annexations when it talked of obligations and guarantees. By 34 votes to 19 the EC of the Petrograd Soviet decided to accept the "explanation"—and this decision was endorsed by the full Soviet the same evening.

Kornilov resigned, and a Government crisis began, with a proposal by Kerensky on May 9th, that a Coalition be formed. After several days of negotiation—it was during these days that the 7th Conference of the Bolshevik Party was held—the EC of the Petrograd Soviet on May 14th decided by 44 to 19, with 2 abstentions, to take part in a Coalition (the minority demanded that the Soviets should take power). Guchkov had already resigned on the 12th, now Milyukov too resigned. Finally, at midnight on May 17th, after prolonged haggling over posts, a Coalition of 10 capitalist and 6 socialist Ministers was formed, with Prince Lvov still as President. The full meeting of the Soviet on the 18th endorsed the decision—as did most Soviets throughout the country.

It was only logical that the British War Cabinet decided on the 23rd (minute 144) to recall Sir George Buchanan and to send its Labour member Arthur Henderson to Petrograd—temporarily at first,

[32] There is a very full account of the great upheaval which the events in Petrograd produced all over the country, as far away as the big cities of Central Siberia, in I. I. Mintz "The First Government Crisis, April 1917 (*Voprosy Istorii*, No. 1, 1967).

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permanently if he wished—so that he could "exercise a powerful influence on the democratic elements which now predominate in Russia".

The Conflict Sharpens

At the beginning of May the Bolsheviks had won majorities in the Soviets of the principal working class districts of Petrograd. In the next few weeks, they substantially increased their representation in both the Petrograd and the Moscow Soviets. On June 13th the workers' section of the Petrograd Soviet voted a Bolshevik resolution for the first time: it called for power to be transferred to the Soviets. By June 1st the Bolshevik representation in the Moscow Soviet had gone up from 143 to 205 members out of 625. In the textile centres of Ivanovo-Voznesensk and Kostroma they won majorities, At Yekaterinburg, the main city of the Urals, they won 95 seats out of 160 in the workers' section of the Soviet: they became the largest party in the workers' section at Saratov and Syzran, the big Volga ports: and won half the seats in the Tsaritsyn Soviet. In all the big cities, during these weeks, Bolshevik representation in the Soviets increased substantially. At the first Congress of Soviets in the Urals (June 22nd-27th) they had an absolute majority. They also substantially increased their representation in the soldiers' sections of many Soviets.[33]

These changes were not isolated. The Party's concentration of its day-to-day work in the factories, stimulating the formation and activity of factory committees, began to produce great results. At the first Petrograd Conference of factory committees (June 12th-16th), where 367 factories were represented, the Bolsheviks won 75 per cent of the votes on all main questions: and similar results were achieved in factory committees' conferences in Moscow and elsewhere. The Bolsheviks had been pioneers in calling for the massive formation of trade unions—and at the third All-Russian Conference of Trade Unions, representing close on 1½ million workers (July 4th-11th), they had 73 delegates out of 211[34]—although on most questions they gathered 83 to 85 votes. Again, in local council (Town Duma) elections—the first in Russian history—they won hundreds of thousands of votes.

An outstanding event was the great demonstration in Petrograd on July 1st. Originally the Bolshevik Central Committee had called a demonstration for June 23rd, in order to give a peaceful outlet to rising anger among the soldiers at the open propaganda for "war to victory" of all kinds of officers' organisations and a Cossack Congress, while Kerensky, as the new War Minister, was restoring draconic powers to officers in the Army.

At the first All-Russian Congress of Soviets, which had met on June 16th—and where the Bolsheviks had 107 delegates out of over 900—the Menshevik leader Chkheidze on the 22nd raised a panic outcry about the Bolsheviks plotting to seize power, and secured first the prohibition of all demonstrations for three days, and then the holding of an "official" demonstration on July 1st. Half a million workers and soldiers took part—and the overwhelming majority of the banners bore such slogans as "Out with the 10 Capitalist Ministers!", "Down with Counter-Revolution!", "All power to the Soviets!". Many similar demonstrations were held in other cities.

The counter-revolutionaries and their "socialist" allies were now determined to cut short any further advances by the Bolsheviks. The Menshevik and Socialist Revolutionary leaders had been forced by mass distrust of the Provisional Government's war aims to call for an International Socialist Conference at Stockholm, which should discuss how to end the war by a democratic peace. But the opposition of the Allied Governments to any of their real Socialists taking part, supported from behind the scenes by the Provisional Government, had soon demonstrated (as Lenin had publicly forecast) that the whole idea was only a diversion on the part of the opportunist Soviet leaders—although it had had the unexpected effect (for them) of incensing the Russian workers still more against the Allies.[35] More radical measures had to be sought—and they were found in a renewed offensive by the Russian Army on the south-western front (against the Austrians).

Renewed War Offensive

For months Russian Ministers and officials, both in Petrograd and in London, had been complaining of delays in contracted deliveries of guns and munitions by their allies. It was well known that many divisions had refused to fight, and that, on the front selected for the attack, many divisions were short of artillery.[36] But there was a political advantage to be gained, and the ground for this was being thoroughly prepared.

On June 12th Buchanan had cabled home that the new Foreign Minister, Tereshchenko, had said that the "extremists" would again try and produce disorders, but that this time the Government was

[33] I owe these details to the work by A. M. Andreyev, mentioned earlier, pp. 197-207.

[34] Vera Vladimirova, *The Revolution of 1917: Chronicle of Events*, vol. III (1923), p. 97.

[35] The story has just been told, with new documents showing the British War Cabinet's manoeuvres in the matter, by R. Page Arnot in his book *The Impact of the Russian Revolution in Britain*.

[36] War Cabinet Minutes 155, 160, 169 provide details.

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thoroughly prepared. A few days before, the same Minister had said that it intended to "settle accounts" with the Petrograd garrison, using Cossacks for the purpose. In cables to Russian representatives abroad, during the third week of June, Tereshchenko indicated that the Provisional Government was now only waiting for "excesses" to have a pretext for suppressing the Bolsheviks.[37] It came without any excesses.

The offensive soon broke down—and Bolshevik propaganda was blamed, although in fact, at the cost of 60,000 soldiers killed or wounded in the attack, more prisoners were captured in one day than had been taken by the British Army in a whole month. The Germans transferred nine divisions from western fronts to stem the offensive. But in order to make certain of an atmosphere of crisis, the four Cadet Ministers resigned (July 15th), nominally because the Government had agreed to autonomy for the Ukraine. Great demonstrations of soldiers and workers began in Petrograd immediately, the same day, and rapidly grew to such dimensions—calling for all power to the Soviets—that the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party itself was obliged to try and turn it into peaceful channels, fearing a premature rising. This was the opportunity the Provisional Government had been waiting for.

6. THE JULY DAYS AND AFTER

In the early morning of July 17th the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary majority of the Central Executive Committee of Soviets issued a manifesto denouncing the demonstrations as "treachery to the revolutionary army" and "undermining the power of the people". Later, Cossacks were sent to attack the demonstrators, who were also subjected to machine-gun fire. On the 18th, units brought from the front surrounded the Peter and Paul Fortress and occupied the Bolshevik Party's headquarters. In all, 56 people were killed and 150 wounded during the day. On the 18th also, the *Pravda* printing office was raided and its machinery broken up by military cadets, while "revelations" about Lenin being a German spy were published in the bourgeois press, and the party leadership decided he must go into hiding.

With the endorsement of the Government's action by the opportunist leaders (July 19th) repressions began on a large scale. Numbers of Bolsheviks were arrested, and warrants issued for the arrest of Lenin and others. The Bolshevik newspapers were suppressed, workers and soldiers' meetings prohibited, whole military units were disbanded, peasant leaders arrested. On July 21st Prince Lvov resigned and the Provisional Government appointed Kerensky Prime Minister;[38] the next day the Soviet Central Executive Committee proclaimed his Cabinet a "Government of Salvation of the Revolution", and Kerensky in turn on the 24th conferred on Kornilov, now commander of the south-western front, unlimited power to use "whatever measures he may choose" to restore discipline—including the death penalty and field court-martial.

Second Coalition Government

The bourgeoisie did not hesitate to take advantage of the situation. Approached by Kerensky to re-enter the Government, the Cadets said they would only do so if all social and political reforms were postponed until the Constituent Assembly, organisations and committees deprived of the right to interfere in State and military affairs, and a struggle carried on against "anti-State" elements—as well, of course, as "full unity with the Allies". Their demands were accepted—and as earnest, the Government began sending out punitive expeditions against peasants seizing the land, dissolved the Finnish Diet which had declared for sovereign independence, and appointed Kornilov Commander-in-Chief. On August 6th a new Government—the second Coalition, once again with a majority of bourgeois Ministers—was announced. The CEC of Soviets had approved its formation beforehand, though by a much smaller majority than before—147 to 46, with 42 abstentions and a number of Bolsheviks absent, under arrest like Kamenev, Kollontay and Lunacharsky, or in hiding. The new Government at once announced that it would continue the war "to a worthy end" (August 7th).

The bourgeoisie now had the bit between its teeth. Kornilov (August 14th) ordered the disbanding of no less than 59 "unreliable" infantry divisions—nearly one-third of the total—and the formation of 33 "reliable" shock units. At a triumphant Congress of Industrialists and Merchants (August 16th), the leading manufacturer Ryabushinsky said that, in order to put things right, "what is needed is the bony hand of hunger and poverty"—a remark echoed by Tereshchenko, as recorded by General Knox, when he explained that now the economic situation would right itself: "The workmen, after starving a little and perhaps burning a factory or two, would consent to accept wages that their employers could afford to pay".[39]

Nevertheless the capitalists were now not content to leave this alluring prospect to chance. All their press and military spokesmen began pressing for a

[37] *Krasny Arkhiv*, 1927. No. I, pp. 22-3.

[38] On this day the ex-Tsar entered in his diary: "This man is really in the right place at this moment: the more power he has, the better."

[39] Knox, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 674.

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dictatorship. The Council of the Cossack League showed the way: in an ultimatum to Kerensky (August 19th) it demanded that Kornilov's appointment as Commander-in-Chief should be made permanent. Next day the Officers' Union followed suit. The press was reporting mass arrests of members of soldiers' committees, and prohibition of an All-Russian Army Congress. Elections to the Constituent Assembly, twice postponed, were on August 22nd postponed once again for three months. As though to set the stage for the coming of a real "strong man" at last, the Provisional Government on the 13th had called a "State Conference" in Moscow—far from the unruly Petrograd workers and soldiers—for the 25th. It was to be a huge affair, with at least half of its 2,500 participants from bourgeois organisations, and most of the rest reliably "moderate".

The Underground Movement

But unknown to businessmen, capitalist politicians and reactionary generals, the tide had already begun to turn—underground. At the 6th Congress of the Bolshevik Party, held in secret from August 8th to 16th, Volodarsky was able to report on behalf of Petrograd that membership there had actually gone up since the "July days", from 33,500 to 36,000. Others could tell the same. Total Party membership was now about 240,000—three times the figure in May. During the Congress—in which Lenin had to participate "from afar", receiving daily reports, seeing draft resolutions and sending notes—the Moscow Area Conference of Factory Committees declared for all power to the Soviets, and a general strike took place in Helsinki. Numerous Soviets, even if not a majority, had passed resolutions declaring their solidarity with the Petrograd workers.[40] The Central Committee of the Baltic Fleet (August 13th), after temporary disorganisations by the arrests, had renewed its decision that no orders, other than operational, were to be obeyed without its endorsement.[41] During the Congress itself resolutions of greetings which had been adopted by mass meetings in factories were received. Most important, however, were the main political decisions arrived at.

These were that State power had now passed into the hands of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie, supported by the military clique, i.e. that the period of dual power was over. The Soviets were "decomposing because they had not taken power themselves in good time". Hence the slogan of transfer of power to the Soviets, as a peaceful development of the revolution, was now out of date. Only the revolutionary liquidation of the bourgeois dictatorship by the proletariat, supported by the poorest peasantry, lay ahead—and for this the Party must prepare the proletariat, avoiding premature battle. In the course of discussion, the Congress rejected opinions that this prospect involved dependence on revolution in Western countries. Every other resolution of the Congress breathed, in one form or another, the spirit of these principal decisions.[42]

The Congress had, within a very few days, superb evidence that its profound optimism was justified. The Party's Central Committee on August 21st denounced the "State Conference" as the organ of a counter-revolutionary plot, and on the 23rd one of the Ward Soviets of Moscow—Zamoskvoretsky—decided by 186 to 89 to call for a general strike on the opening day. The trade unions of Moscow supported the call. In spite of a resolution condemning the strike adopted by a small majority at a joint meeting of the Workers' and Soldiers' Soviets of Moscow, 150 factories with over 400,000 workers stopped on August 25th. In spite of the subsequent bellicose speeches of the generals at the State Conference—Kornilov, Kaledin and Alexeyev—and the support given them by the Menshevik leaders, the event had an immense repercussion throughout the country, expressed by innumerable resolutions of factory meetings and trade unions. In the Petrograd City Council elections on September 2nd, the Bolsheviks with 61 seats were second only to the Socialist-Revolutionaries (75), and had more than all others put together.

7. REACTION'S LAST BIG THROW

Cables from British military representatives in Russia gave the War Cabinet advance information that their Russian friends were preparing a big stroke. Kornilov believed the Government too weak, "and he was contemplating vigorous political action" (August 20th): the Cossack Union and the Officers' League represented the views of "a large section of the best elements in the army" (August 21st). General Knox, back in London, told the Cabinet on September 7th: "Kornilov was a strong character, an honest patriot, and the best man in sight. He had the support of the Cossacks. . . . He (Knox) had no

[40] A. M. Andreyev, *op. cit.*, p. 235, has established that these numbered 32 out of 82 whose attitude was recorded.

[41] *Ibid.*, p. 240.

[42] It was at this Congress that the small group of Social-Democrats who had completely broken away from the Mensheviks (the "Mejrayontsy") were admitted to the Party. Among them was Trotsky, although as recently as May, at the Conference of this group, he had rejected unconditional entry into the Bolshevik Party (whom he had combated for many years). He was nevertheless elected to the new Central Committee.

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faith in Kerensky . . . Kerensky was afraid of shedding blood. . . . A force of 10,000 loyalists would be enough to subdue Petrograd—the main source of disorder—for the Russians were cowards."[43]

Once again a reverse at the front—the entry of the Germans into Riga, in circumstances which suggested that the Russian High Command had planned the whole affair—and an outburst of abuse of the Bolsheviks in the capitalist press, were used as a pretext. Kerensky sent his deputy War Minister, Savinkov, to GHQ with a request that Kornilov should send reliable troops to Petrograd: at the same time, four of the most revolutionary regiments were ordered out of the capital (September 5th and 6th), and *Proletarii*—substitute for *Pravda*—was closed down (September 7th).

But Kornilov decided to act on his own. He decreed (September 8th) the formation of a "Petrograd Army", and ordered General Krymov to move on the city with the 3rd Corps, occupy it, disarm pro-Bolshevik units and the Red Guards and dissolve the Soviets. He sent orders to Kerensky to dissolve the Provisional Government and yield full power to himself. He issued a manifesto "to the Russian people" announcing that he was taking over supreme power. At the same time, measures similar to those in Petrograd were to be taken by a Cossack regiment, supported by military cadets, in Moscow. The Cadet Ministers once more resigned. The strong character had acted at last.

So far as Kerensky and the leaders of the Soviet CEC were concerned, Kornilov's calculations were not far out. They spent the next 24 hours in discussing how to manage the situation—Kerensky was appointed head of a "Directory" of five—without breaking with the bourgeoisie. But on the morning of September 9th the Bolshevik group in the Petrograd Soviet called a meeting of its own and the Socialist-Revolutionaries' military organisations with delegates of the ward Soviets and factory committees, which led to the formation the same evening, with participation of the CEC and all Soviet parties —including the Bolsheviks and soldiers and sailors from Kronstadt—of a "People's Committee for fighting Counter-Revolution".

This included 7 or 8 Bolsheviks out of 30. But it gave an immense impetus from above to the furious preparations which had begun during the day below—on a direct appeal from the leading Bolshevik organisations: it also led to the formation of similar all-in committees in 100 towns and many provinces throughout Russia, in which a united front of the Socialist organisations existed for the first time. Kerensky was now emboldened to proclaim Kornilov a traitor.

[43] War Cabinet Minutes 221, 223, 229.

Kornilov Fiasco

The real preparations in Petrograd, however, were at the factory, street and barracks level. Red Guards units were called out, and new units formed and armed in large numbers. Workers' committees immediately took charge in arms and munitions works. Trenches were dug and barbed wire entanglements put up all round the city. An inter-ward committee of the capital's Ward Soviets (controlled by the Bolsheviks since July) became the effective staff of all these and many other offensive measures. The trade unions played an active part. Within three days nearly 40,000 Red Guards, reinforced by over 20,000 sailors and soldiers, were at their posts, in and around Petrograd, supported by artillery.

But the measures taken were not only defensive—and the real weakness of the bourgeoisie's "strong man" was speedily revealed. Railwaymen at all the junctions round the capital had taken the necessary steps to halt the advance of Krymov's troops—and this was followed up by the "agitators" from Petrograd. And one after another the "reliable" Cossack units themselves, on hearing why they had been sent to Petrograd, refused to go any further: one division arrested its officers and handed them over to the local Soviet. Similar action stopped the movement of troops from other fronts at many big junctions, and numerous generals were arrested by local Soviets. Many officers at Helsinki who had declared for Kornilov were killed by the sailors, and Krymov committed suicide.

The fiasco was complete. Above all, it revealed, to the masses, in a few days of concentrated political experience, what the policy of Kerensky and his colleagues in the Soviet CEC was leading to, and where the strength and hopes of the revolution really lay—in the working class led by the Bolsheviks. On September 14 the Provisional Government belatedly proclaimed that Russia was now a Republic—but this gesture could not save it from the lessons taught by the Kornilov rebellion.

These lessons bore fruit quite quickly. On September 13th the Petrograd Soviet—many of its anti-Bolshevik deputies recalled by their electors and replaced by Bolsheviks—for the first time adopted a Bolshevik motion calling for all power to the Soviets. On the 15th the Moscow Soviet decided to maintain the Red Guards at full strength, and on the 18th it followed the example of the Petrograd Soviet. Both in the next few days sacked their old Presidiums and elected Bolsheviks and Left Socialist-Revolutionaries. Kiev, Tver and many other Soviets took the same step. A West Siberian Congress of Soviets (September 19th-23rd) produced a Bolshevik majority.[44] Army Committees and regimental com-

[44] Y. V. Ivanov, "Building Soviets in Siberia, 1917" in *Sovetskoye Gosudarstvo i Pravo*, No. 7, 1967.

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mittees on the Northern and Western Fronts, garrisons in the rear, brought the support of millions of soldiers for the Bolshevik demand. Scores of insurrections and other "disturbances" in the county areas, and formal seizures of power by the Soviets in Central Asia, showed that the peasants, too, were catching up. Both Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary Parties, on September 13th and 14th, decided against further coalition with the Cadets—and on the 14th the Bolsheviks in the CEC offered to support a Soviet Government formed by those parties on a programme of immediate democratic reforms (but they refused).

The "Democratic Conference"

Most significant events—though not widely noticed at that time—occurred at the "Democratic Conference", another medley of all kinds of organisations, which had been engineered by the leaders of the Soviet CEC as a substitute for the 2nd Congress of Soviets due to assemble in September. It was really used by Kerensky as a screen for yet more bargaining with the bourgeoisie. At the Conference (September 27th-October 5th) there was for the first time a split in the Menshevik delegation, 75 opposing any new Coalition and 65 supporting it: and there were also divisions among the Socialist-Revolutionary delegates.

But more significant still, was what happened in the delegation from trade unions and trades councils at the Democratic Conference. At the Trade Union Conference in July, there had been a small anti-Bolshevik majority, and the Central Council elected there had been composed accordingly. It was under its auspices that the delegation was sent. But by 73 to 8 the union delegates—now representing nearly 1,900,000 workers—and by 139 to 32 the whole delegation, voted against a Coalition and for the Soviets taking power. As a result, Grinevich the Menshevik, chairman of the Central Council, resigned.[45]

8. THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION

From now on, the initiative was firmly in the hands of the revolutionary working class. Kerensky could still send punitive expeditions to Tashkent, Taganrog, Saratov and into the countryside to suppress what was becoming a peasant insurrection. Lenin was still in hiding, and several Bolsheviks still in jail. On October 8th Kerensky formed his third—and last—Coalition. He could still make speeches at the "Pre-Parliament", or "Council of the Republic", set up by the capitalist and opportunist majority of the Democratic Conference. The Provisional Government was still able to make political gestures like issuing a writ for the Finnish Diet to assemble (October 13th)—a fortnight after it had assembled without official permission; or dissolving the old Tsarist Duma and State Council (October 19th)—months after even right wing majorities in the Soviets had been demanding this.

But these events were not what the eyes of all Russia were fixed on.[46] On October 6th, yielding at last to the pressure of the Soviets all over the country, the Soviet CEC decided to call the Congress for November 2nd: it was symbolic that the decision was made on the day that a nation-wide railway strike began, after Kerensky had prohibited it the day before. On the 8th, the Petrograd Soviet elected a new Executive Committee with a Bolshevik majority, and Trotsky as chairman. In elections for the Ward Councils in Moscow, the Bolsheviks won more seats (350) than the Cadets, SRs and Mensheviks combined (319). At the end of September (25th-27th) Lenin had written his now famous letters to the leading Bolshevik Party organisations, *The Bolsheviks Must Take Power* and *Marxism and Insurrection*, insisting that all the conditions now existed for organising the armed overthrow of the Provisional Government and the establishment of Soviet power. Then they were followed up by a letter *To the Central Committee, Petrograd and Moscow Committees of the Bolshevik Party* (October 14th) and an article *Advice of an Onlooker* (October 21st)—driving in the same point.

Ripe for Insurrection

Then, on October 23rd, came the historic meeting of the Bolshevik Central Committee which voted by 10 to 2 to accept Lenin's resolution that the time for insurrection was "fully ripe", and that all Party organisations should begin to work accordingly: electing a Political Bureau to guide the work. On the 26th, the EC of the Petrograd Soviet decided (only two Mensheviks voting against) to set up a Military Revolutionary Committee, to safeguard the revolution against further Kornilov-type adventures; the soldiers' Section of the Soviet worked out the details: and on the 29th the full meeting of the Petrograd Soviet adopted the plan by an overwhelming majority.

Meanwhile, Congresses of Soviets all over the country were passing resolutions denouncing the

[45] D. Antoshkin, *The Trade Union Movement in Russia* (in Russian), 1925, p. 253; A. M. Pankratova (ed.), *History of the Trade Union Movement in the USSR* (in Russian), 1955, p. 31; *Izvestia*, 20 September, 1917.

[46] Here John Reed's immortal *Ten Days That Shook the World* begins to add its vivid picture to the accounts of Philips Price and the new *History of the October Revolution*.

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Provisional Government and demanding the transfer of power to the Soviets. On the 29th, Lenin reported on the situation at an extended meeting of the Central Committee, with representatives of the main Party organisations concerned present. By 19 votes to 2, with 4 abstentions, the resolution of the 23rd was endorsed, and a group of 5 leading Bolsheviks was chosen—all of them, in point of fact, either deputies of the Petrograd Soviet or members of the Soviet CEC—to be incorporated in the Military Revolutionary Committee and thus strengthen its work.

Two days later Zinoviev and Kamenev, the dissenting members, published a notorious disclaimer in Maxim Gorky's paper, provoking a vigorous denunciation of them as "strikebreakers" by Lenin. But even this unparalleled act could no longer affect the issue, as it turned out—so isolated was the counter-revolutionary camp by now. Members of the Bolshevik Central Committee were on mission in all the main centres organising the Party forces in the Soviets, the army, the factories, the Red Guards, etc., for the insurrection. In Petrograd, on November 2nd, the Military Revolutionary Committee held its first plenary meeting, appointed commissars to all military units and key organisations, sent out agitators, and issued an appeal to the Cossacks. The next day it elected a Bureau, composed of three Bolsheviks—Podvoisky, Antonov and Sadovsky—and two Left Socialist Revolutionaries, Lazimir and Sukharkov. It is their signatures, either as Chairman (mostly Lazimir or Podvoisky) or as secretary (mostly Antonov), which figure most frequently in the hundreds of orders, credentials, passes, etc., collected and recently published in three massive volumes.[47]

The Bureau worked out, in the greatest possible detail, the necessary plans for concentrating the Red Guards, soldiers and sailors, taking control of key buildings, bridges, etc., securing arms and distributing them, and so forth—as well as calling up the cruiser "Aurora" and four destroyers from Kronstadt into the heart of the city.

The bourgeois press freely discussed the imminence of insurrection and the Provisional Government moved large numbers of troops, not only to the vicinity of Petrograd, but to a number of other cities. The Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary leaders of the Soviet CEC did what they could, not only by denouncing the Bolsheviks, but also (on October 30th) by postponing the Congress of Soviets to November 7th, and by urging delegates who had arrived to go home. Trotsky, who had already given signs of pinning faith exclusively to the Congress, spoke at a private meeting of Bolshevik delegates on the 6th in favour of taking no decision about power until the Congress opened—but this had no effect, except to produce another vigorous blast from Lenin, in a letter the same evening, crying delay "would be equivalent to death". He arrived in disguise the same night, immediately beginning to work in the MRC.

The Die Cast

For the great die had been cast. Early on November 6th, by Government orders, military cadets had raided the Party printshop and broken up the type there: it had ordered the arrest of the MRC and the raising of the bridges connecting the city centre with the working class districts: brought about 2,000 troops to the Winter Palace: and instructed all units of the garrison to be confined to barracks. But within an hour the MRC had sent soldiers who had cleared out the cadets, and thereafter sent out far and wide its orders to "stand to". The revolutionary forces began taking action in the course of the day, and by the evening the whole city was in their hands—without any bloodshed. Neither Cossacks nor the specially summoned troops offered any resistance—nor could such forces as had been told to go to Petrograd get anywhere near the capital. By the morning of November 7th the Provisional Government was physically isolated in the Winter Palace—and the historic proclamation, in the name of the MRC and written by Lenin, "To the Citizens of Russia" was being placarded all over the city, announcing that "the Provisional Government has been deposed. State power has passed into the hands of the organ of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies—the Military Revolutionary Committee, which heads the Petrograd proletariat and the garrison".

The same afternoon, he spoke at a meeting of the Petrograd Soviet: and in the evening attended the opening of the second Congress of Soviets. There was a preliminary attempt by the "old gang" to hold up proceedings—during which the blank shot from the "Aurora", heralding the storming of the Winter Palace was heard—but all in vain. The Congress elected a mainly Bolshevik and Left SR Presidium, and at 3 a.m. on November 8th heard that the Winter Palace had been taken and the Provisional Government arrested. It proclaimed that all power was now in the hands of the Soviets.

On November 7th and 8th it adopted the Decree on Peace, the Decree on the Land and the list of a Provisional Workers' and Peasants' Government,

[47] In view of subsequent legends, it should be noted that Trotsky, although chairman of the Petrograd Soviet, was only one of 82 members of the MRC, was not a member of the Bureau, and never was its chairman. The MRC functioned as a working committee, all its members carrying out what jobs were necessary as they were available. This also included Trotsky.

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headed by Lenin: and elected a new Central Executive Committee of 62 Bolsheviks, 29 Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, and 10 members of other parties.

9. SOME CONCLUSIONS

No article can replace the full study of such a momentous subject, even in the books already available to the English-speaking reader; and therefore to attempt full conclusions would be pretentious. But some reflections seem to impose themselves—all the more after fifty years during which the grandeur of the events of 1917 has not been dimmed for those who study them (least of all for those who were their contemporaries).

1. The October Revolution was the work literally of millions of working people—unlike every previous transfer of power from one class to another.

2. The workers, soldiers, sailors and even peasants of Russia had experienced and tested out for themselves the pretensions and the falseness of all the parties on whom they had pinned their hopes when they overthrew the Tsar.

3. In gaining this experience and profiting by it, the industrial working class had been in the lead all the way—justifying the conclusions which Marx, Engels and Lenin had drawn from the insurrection of the Paris workers in 1848, the Paris Commune of 1871 and the first Russian Revolution of 1905.

4. It was in the changeover of the Soviets from opportunist class-collaborationist leadership to that of the revolutionary Social-Democrats (Bolsheviks), in the free-est possible conditions that any working class on earth has ever enjoyed (not excluding the British), that the truly popular nature of this gigantic upheaval manifested itself.

5. Far, therefore, from the Bolshevik Party led by Lenin being the small gang of fanatics and conspirators who fastened their will on the Russian masses (the legend which began to be spread by the lying hacks of the capitalist class on November 7th, 1917, and continues in this and all other capitalist countries to the present day) the Bolsheviks both voiced and led the people in a truly "open conspiracy".

6. Equally lying is the legend that the weakness of the other side lay in Kerensky's "unwillingness to shed blood"; or his "weakness", or that of the Russian capitalists whom he was backing: or his failure to have Lenin shot, as one egregious ignoramus proclaimed in the British press only recently. All concerned did their damnedest to drown the revolution in torrents of blood—"strong men" and "politicians" alike—and they all failed because their own forces would not support them.

7. The revolution in this respect was particularly a defeat for capitalist Russia's "glorious Allies"—the ruling classes of Britain and France—as their own Ambassadors and other representatives admitted afterwards, by showing how they were constantly egging on Kerensky and the generals to violence (only scant justice could be done in this article to the vivid material now available in War Cabinet records).

8. The revolution was a triumph for the resolute loyalty to Marxist principles, of the Bolsheviks, led by Lenin—both in their refusal to be diverted from their aim by finding themselves in a small minority, and in their determination at all times to find common language and aspirations with the widest mass of their fellow citizens (even including, when they could, those from whom they differed profoundly in politics).

In these respects, as in others, the great October Revolution is not something alien from the British working class or British history: it has invaluable lessons for all those who strive to learn from the class struggles of the British workers, from the fight against exploitation in our own history.

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The National Future of Scotland and Wales

Bert Pearce

COMMUNIST policy for many years has supported demands for Parliaments for Wales and Scotland. Certainly for more than thirty years we have recognised the national rights of the Scottish and Welsh peoples and pioneered much of the fight for their demands—for increased political devolution, Secretaries of State, Parliamentary Self-Government, and for the economic and cultural conditions essential to their further national development.

Especially in the 1940-50 period there was considerable discussion and study of Scottish and Welsh history, and the publication of economic and social plans for the two countries. Some of this valuable work was published, as in John Gollan's book *Scottish Prospect* (1949), still one of the most thorough treatments of Scotland's national problems; and in various pamphlets by Idris Cox and others in Wales. Much of it still provides a sound foundation for our approach to the national problems in Britain.

But today we need to elaborate our policy and its implications, and to examine why it is not more effectively carried out in our own work, and in that of the Labour Movement as a whole. National consciousness is growing and will continue to grow. The progress of the Nationalist parties in Wales and Scotland is only one indication of this.

In every field, social, economic and cultural, the main issues demand treatment on an All-Scottish (or All-Welsh) scale. New approaches to the problems of state power and local government, regional democracy and planning press themselves upon us. In Wales and Scotland such modern developments are bound to take on national forms. A new debate, and constructive answers to such problems are essential for the growth of an effective Socialist movement in Britain, all the more so since some of the areas most advanced in Communist mass influence and electoral support have developed historically in Wales and Scotland.

This article, partly based on material from a Communist Party Executive discussion in July, will, it is hoped, lead to much wider argument and so to better understanding and more vigorous campaigning on issues which are important for the movement generally and not only in Scotland and Wales.

If more of the illustration refers to Wales, though I believe the approach is generally true for Scotland also, it is due entirely to the limitations of my own knowledge and researches. I am sure comrades from Scotland, who have done extensive work on Scottish policy, will more than remedy this in discussion.

Historical Background

The Communist approach to the national question is in the first place historical. Peoples develop into national groups and into nations in the course of their settlement as united communities in defined territories, developing a common language, economic basis and culture. Nations come into existence and can also go out of existence, merging with others.

The formation of national states in Western Europe was primarily a feature of the period of rising capitalism up to the end of the 19th century. Today in the new epoch of rising Socialist societies, we see the growth of new Socialist nations, and the development of new nations on a non-capitalist foundation in the former colonial territories. Vietnam, Cuba, the Middle East, Indonesia, Africa, Greece—all the focal points of world politics today underline the conclusion that national independence is inseparably connected with the struggle against imperialism, and with the progress of Socialism throughout the world. The same lesson is clear in Britain's internal politics, where all the main problems are rooted in the domination of our society by the great monopoly firms, including an increasing proportion of international and American controlled combines.

Our central problem is not the verbal definition of nationhood, but to grasp what are the special features of British development and what are the specific national needs of the various peoples in Britain today. How can the fight for these national demands be related to the movement for Socialist change which is the condition for their fullest satisfaction?

Scotland

In a memorandum in 1949, George Thomson summarised the early history as follows:

> "The Lothian Plain was settled by the Angles and until the beginning of the Eleventh Century formed part of the Kingdom of Northumbria. It was annexed to Scotland in 1018. This was a decisive

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event in Scottish history, because the Lothians are the most fertile part of the country. It meant that English was adopted as the official language and it established a bond between the two countries which made their union inevitable. Having acquired the Lothians, the Scottish kings developed feudalism in a form almost identical with the Norman, the two systems being interwoven. Only the Highlands remained tribal and Gaelic speaking.

"Hence when the Scottish and English crowns were united under James I (1601) there was in Scotland the nucleus of a native English-speaking bourgeoisie. The union of the two countries was urged by William of Orange. For several years, reluctant to grant freedom of trade to their Scottish rivals, the English merchant-capitalists refused, but in 1707 they accepted it in order to secure the Hanoverian succession.

"It was not at all popular in Scotland, but the fact that it went through without serious opposition shows that the Scottish bourgeoisie knew where their future lay. Thanks to the Union they were able to participate on equal terms with the English in building the British Empire. The Highlands were subdued in 1745. The chiefs became lairds, their followers, tenants; then the lairds evicted the tenants to clear the land for sheep."

Referring to share in the creation of the Empire, opened up for Scottish merchant-capitalists by the Union, John Gollan wrote:

"This, combined with the growth of manufactures, launched Scotland on the road to speedy economic development and foreshadowed the appearance of its new ruling class. . . . When textiles, till then the dominant industry, started to give way, first to coal and iron in the latter half of the century, and then at the end, and in the 19th Century, to steel and shipbuilding, the pattern of modern Scotland was laid. It was part and parcel of the British Imperialist system . . .

". . . this development was the work of Scotsmen, not Englishmen. The Scotsmen of the capitalist class were now linked with the landed gentry and the banks, and with their English brethren. The integration of Scottish and English capital was but a further —natural—development freely entered into by both ruling classes at the top. . . . The Scots capitalist class had no objection to exploiting the English working class as well as their own. The profit motive was always stronger than national welfare and sentiment."

(*Scottish Prospect* (1948), pp. 211-212)

Wales

The early Welsh tribal system did not develop into a native feudalism; it was broken down by the impact of English (Norman) feudalism. The military conquest of the country was completed by Edward I in 1282. Despite sporadic revolts in the following two centuries (notably that of Owain Glyn Dwr, who convened a Welsh Parliament in 1404), when Henry Tudor captured the English Crown in 1485 to become Henry VII of England, founder of its Tudor dynasty, he did so with considerable Welsh support.

The Act of Union in 1536, finally ended Welsh independence, incorporating Wales into England, with Welsh representation in the English Parliament, and Welsh laws, language and religious institutions largely suppressed. The settlement, aimed at securing the centralised authority of the crown, by creating a class of small landed gentry to exercise Local Government and social stability in loyalty to English rule. In this it reflected a process already in being, as the Welsh chieftains became landed gentry and their followers, tenants. Trade and commerce grew up around the English garrison towns, associated with English law and order, and with the slow, but steady spread of the English language.

Thus in Wales, at this early formative stage in their development, the elements of a future bourgeoisie or capitalist ruling class were already rapidly ceasing to be specifically Welsh. They became part of a united British ruling class with the same economic and class interests. Despite historical variations important in their effect on the radical and national movements, a pattern broadly similar to that of Scotland emerges. When the Industrial Revolution brought in the hectic development of modern capitalism and with it the transformation of the economic backwardness of Wales and Scotland, neither country had a native bourgeoisie strong enough to develop in independence from, or opposition to, the English. The creation of the British bourgeois-democratic state in its modern form, and the profound social and industrial changes of the 19th century, were carried out under a unified capitalist class in which the Scottish and Welsh elements were completely merged into the British.

Imperialism and the Revival of National Consciousness

Two centuries of integrated development into the system of modern British Imperialism have given the national problem in Britain its peculiar stamp, a distinctive combination of two conflicting features.

On the one hand these two centuries have seen the most drastic transformation of the social and economic structure of Scotland and Wales. Railways, steam-power, coal, iron, shipbuilding and tinplate made central Scotland and South Wales world centres of industrial growth. Population grew; hundreds of thousands flocked to the industrial towns and mining valleys. Modern Wales and modern Scotland were forged in the British industrial revolution.

The Scottish and Welsh capitalists shared in the immense accumulation of British capital. The Scottish and Welsh workers played a historic part in

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the great struggles out of which came the British Labour Movement—the Chartists, early Trade Unionism, the Co-operatives, and the long fight for industrial and political unity of the workers throughout Britain. Interchange of population, increasing use of English as the common language, united struggles against exploitation by a unified capitalism, and the interpenetration of art, entertainment, sport and social life, all meant that economically, politically and to some extent culturally the three peoples of England, Scotland and Wales developed increasingly as one.

On the other hand stands the unquestionable survival throughout this long period, of a distinct Scottish and Welsh nationality, so that today, despite these centuries of political unity and closely integrated development, there is a growing national consciousness amongst all sections of the Welsh and Scottish people. The facts of history make clear the basis of this resilient sense of nationality.

For more than 1,000 years the Scottish and Welsh people have been settled in their present territories, developing a history, a character and rich culture of their own. Scotland emerged as an independent kingdom, never militarily conquered, with her own Parliament and legal and educational systems, much of which remain distinct from the rest of Britain today. Wales has maintained its own native language, the only one of the original Celtic languages of the British Isles with a still living mass basis, spoken by almost three-quarters of a million people. Both countries have a national literary and artistic heritage which is a vital part of their national consciousness today.

Kenneth Morgan, in his invaluable book *Wales in British Politics, 1868-1922*, draws attention to the surprising lack of published historical research on the social and economic development of Wales since 1536. He rightly remarks that a study of modern Wales and modern Scotland might well shed new light on the political characteristics of contemporary Britain. This is a challenge that merits the attention of Marxist historians and political students.

Much of value about the roots of present-day trends and attitudes will be uncovered by more thorough research into the relations between the revival of national consciousness from the 1870s on and the origins of the Labour Movement.

Political nationalism, expressing serious demands for measures of devolution up to self-government in association with a broad programme of radical reform, emerged in Scotland and Wales in the last quarter of the 19th century, when Britain's age of imperialist expansion was running to its close. It was the product of many factors. Industrialisation, the growth of the capitalist class and of the working class, the spread of mass literacy, and religious nonconformity, land reform, the extension of the franchise, local government reform—all these produced a powerful combination of radical liberalism and national consciousness, associated in Wales with Tom Ellis, Lloyd George, and the Cymru Fydd movement of 1887.

It had important and lasting effects in establishing the national question as a serious issue and developing a whole series of administrative, educational and cultural institutions for Scotland and Wales. The demand for Home Rule (in various forms) won considerable support in the British Liberal movement in its rising tide up to the General Election of 1892.

But with the development of monopoly capitalism and the imperialist division of the world, the predominant interests of British capitalism asserted themselves over Welsh, Scottish and English capitalists alike. They swung over to the policies of the new Imperialism, heralding the eventual split and decline of the Liberal party. The alliance of Welsh radical liberalism and nationalism collapsed. The stormy issues of the radical programme—church disestablishment, land reform—lost their significance in the new 20th century world.

The question of self-government (home rule), while surviving to appear in sporadic resolutions and conferences, was swallowed up by the greater mass concern with the rise of the working class movement, the foundation of the Labour Party, Trade Unionism, the first world war and its revolutionary aftermath, with the birth of the Communist Party.

Between the Wars

The general crisis of capitalism, marked by the 1914-18 war, the General Strike of 1926 and the economic slump of 1929, brought about a revival of nationalism, but in a new setting. The decisive popular movements were those against capitalist exploitation, unemployment, fascism and war. The central theme was social change—the growing movement for a socialist transformation of society.

A basic feature of the crisis of British imperialism was the decline of the older, basic industries—coal, iron and steel, shipbuilding, agriculture. Increased competition in world markets and the chronic depression of the 1930s exposed the parasitic nature of the British economy. The older, heavy industry areas could be left to decay while profits from colonial investment, banking and trade continued. Newer, light mass production industries were naturally (from a capitalist point of view) sited in the Midlands or South East of England, where large urban populations provided a ready labour force, close markets and minimum transport costs. Hence the crisis bore most heavily on the older centres of heavy industry which were also geographically the fringe areas of Britain. South Wales and central Scotland, like

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North East England, earned their black fame as the "Depressed Areas" devastated by the highest rates of unemployment, starvation and depopulation.

Unemployment and depopulation were even greater in the agricultural areas than in the industrial regions. In Wales this has been an important factor in the undermining of the Welsh language and the cultural expression based upon it. Whatever artificial stimulants are applied, the health and survival of a language must depend upon its everyday use in living communities. This is the root of the crisis of Welsh national culture in a distorted economy where the wind of big business profit blows the young people from the farms, the villages and the mining towns, leaving them dried up and declining.

The main fight against these conditions, which were destroying the economic and social structure and indeed the very people of Scotland and Wales, was, of course, the massive struggle of the working class against unemployment, the Means Test and against the Tory National Government. These battles for the right to work, to preserve the dignity of man and the unity and power of labour, created some of the most vital traditions in the long struggle for national survival.

Elements of the radical middle class, and especially the intellectuals (in Wales notably the Welsh speaking sections) reacted to the crisis by forming new political parties—Plaid Cymru (the Welsh Nationalist Party) in 1925; the Scottish Nationalist Party in 1928. Basically they attempted to harness a new (and confused) radical programme, including the equal spreading of property ownership, and the co-operative principle in industry to the aims of complete independence, separation from England (Dominion Status) and a Welsh culture firmly based on Welsh as the official language. Their early leadership and policy contained a mixture of reactionary trends, anti-sovietism and utopian confusion, with a genuine passion for Welsh and Scottish nationhood and rights. Up to the war of 1939, despite considerable influence in University and professional circles, their growth was quite limited.

Post-war Developments

Since 1944 there has been a notable new rise in national awareness in Wales and Scotland. In the immediate post-war years they shared in the world-wide atmosphere arising from the nature of the anti-fascist alliance and the recognition of many nations freed either from fascist occupation or from the older colonial rule. At home the general expectation was of drastic social and economic changes. The demand for a Scottish and a Welsh Parliament featured in campaigns supported by varied political parties and organisations. Petitions were organised by the "Parliament for Wales" movement and the Scottish Convention. The Scottish Petition in the 1950s secured some two million signatures.

But the most marked growth of national political expression has been in the last two years. It has been most dramatically highlighted by the substantial Nationalist party votes in both Scotland and Wales in the March 1966 General Election, then the spectacular success of Gwynfor Evans in the Carmarthen by-election and the even more startling swing of industrial Rhondda West in March 1967. The 10,000 Rhondda votes for Plaid Cymru demonstrated a profound upheaval in political attitudes. The three main causes of this upheaval are not temporary events, but basic and persistent processes.

First—the hard lesson of the last 10 years, that the pattern of unequal development still persists—to the detriment of Wales and Scotland.

Second—the increasing need for regional forms of planning and local government.

Third—the deep disillusionment with right wing Labour policies, both in national and local affairs.

Any examination of these factors makes it clear that the importance of national consciousness in Scotland and Wales must continue to grow.

The increasing difficulties of British Imperialism will dictate sharper struggles—as we see now—over wages, jobs, social security and on the issues of world peace, armaments and foreign alignments. These problems continue to affect Scotland and Wales to an exaggerated degree. Polaris in Holy Loch, German Panzers and now the Luftwaffe in Pembrokeshire, reports of US air force "Vietnam training flights" over mid-Wales, arouse a national resentment which intensifies the general protest against the war policies of imperialism as a whole.

A general feature of British political life today is the pressure for regional planning and regional democracy. This applies with added force to Wales and Scotland, where it is bound to take the form of demands for increased national self-government.

The experience of right-wing Labour domination is now a prolonged and bitter one, especially in such areas as South Wales where local councils and Parliamentary Constituencies have been ruled by unbroken Labour majorities for up to forty years. The worst features of opportunist politics, complacency, careerism, nepotism, have bred a deep desire for some progressive change. The Labour Governments from 1945 to 1951, and 1964 to 1966 have culminated in the acute frustration of Wilson's "severe restraint". The most solid Labour areas in Britain have been rewarded by the heaviest unemployment and the callous treatment of the miners. Pit and rail closures ruthlessly carried through, regardless of the run-down of entire communities; 40,000 unemployed in Wales—5,000 of them young

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boys and girls—the worst economic prospect since the war—these are bitter facts whose lessons are being reluctantly but inevitably faced in thousands of minds. It is turning people increasingly towards new and experimental alternatives, amongst which any form of increased voice in their own affairs must be attractive.

The Basic Answer—Socialism

The main problems of the Scottish and Welsh people—unemployment, wage freeze, insecurity, bad social conditions, depopulation, decline of culture and language—are the consequences of monopoly capitalism. Wales and Scotland are not colonies exploited by England. Geographical and industrial factors have rendered them liable to the same economic distortions as similar regions of England. Of course the consequences of capitalist exploitation have this additional dimension in Scotland and Wales, that there social decay threatens a distinct national heritage and culture; young people driven away to find work, are leaving their own country, cutting their roots in its characteristic way of life.

But these effects, and the exploitation of the people in the North East and North West areas of England have the same cause, the domination of Britain by an Imperialist ruling class in which the elements of English, Scottish and Welsh capitalism are completely merged. In the long struggle against this British ruling class a united British working class movement has been built up, which is the most powerful force for progress and socialism. While vital further steps of organisational and political unity need to be taken, this Labour, Trade Union and Co-operative movement already provides the basic instrument through which workers in Wales, Scotland and England, struggling in the same industries against the same employers and the same capitalist policies, are able to defend their conditions and resist attempts to use sectional or national divisions to undermine them.

It is in the development of the militant alliance on the Left, to defeat the paralysing grip of the right wing, that the power will be created to defeat the big business combines whose servants fill the corridors of power today. Whatever constitutional changes are made, the people of Scotland and Wales will never be free to develop their countries as they wish, until government, industry, land and finance are taken out of the grip of this highly organised monopoly ruling class.

The working class and progressive movements of Wales and Scotland, because of their historical development, can play a very important part in the ultimate victory of the Left in the British Labour Movement. This is the key to transforming the entire political situation.

It is therefore in the prime interests of the Welsh and Scottish working class and people to maintain and strengthen that united socialist and progressive movement in Britain to which they have already made such a great contribution.

It is equally in their special interest to advance to the utmost the common struggle for the socialist transformation of Britain as a whole. Their national development is taking place within the integrated economy of one of the main world capitalist centres. In the conditions of modern industrialism and the ever-extending power of science and technology, the greatest advantage and the fastest social progress for the people would undoubtedly be achieved by the co-ordinated socialist planning of England, Wales and Scotland as a whole. This would make for faster industrial growth, with the most fruitful use of the varied natural resources and economic possibilities of the three countries. It would provide the best conditions for the much-needed redistribution of industry, population and social development. It would help the establishment of the most efficient and cheapest integrated transport system. The heritage of neglect and backwardness which Wales and Scotland still share with certain older industrial areas of England, could most effectively be remedied by the proper use of the total resources of the combined countries under social ownership and with adequate powers for the direction of industry and capital investment.

These advantages in maintaining a united British state in some form, and maintaining the unity of the progressive movements in Britain are widely understood and supported in Wales and Scotland. It can be estimated that a large majority would support some degree of self-government, but a very small minority would advocate complete separation. Nevertheless it is also obvious that centralised government *under monopoly capitalism* has brought some major disadvantages for the two smaller countries. The full participation by the Welsh and Scottish people in the cause of progress therefore depends on the combining of their two basic interests—the struggle for the right to self-government of their own affairs in Scotland and Wales, and the struggle for overall economic and social liberation which only a Socialist Britain can ensure.

Communist Policy

It is a particular responsibility and contribution of the Communist Party to work for the effective combination of these two fundamental interests of our people—national fulfilment and socialist advance. The demand for self-government and Parliaments for Scotland and Wales has been our policy for many years. It is specified in our programme *The British Road to Socialism* and has been repeated and

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elaborated in Scottish and Welsh Party resolutions and pamphlets, and Election programmes especially from 1944 on.

Yet we cannot say it has been made a serious and sustained issue in the Labour, Trade Union and Co-operative movement throughout this time. In Scotland it has been the policy of the Scottish Labour Party and Scottish TUC. In Wales official Labour policy seems to have retreated since 1945 from even the rather vague endorsement of Home Rule by various national leaders in the pre-war period. In practice the issue has been largely ignored, while limited practical steps of devolution (a Secretary of State; the Welsh Advisory Council, the Welsh Economic Council) have been taken with extreme slowness and ineffectiveness.

In this situation our Party has done too little to launch serious campaigning for these national demands or, in particular, to win the Labour Movement for active support for them.

There are two main reasons for this. First, a strong tendency to think of a Welsh (or Scottish) Parliament as impracticable under capitalism, and merely a desirable extension of democracy which will be readily granted in a Socialist Britain.

Secondly, the view that any real struggle for self-government would lead to a division of the working class and progressive forces, weakening their fight for immediate demands, and diverting them from the main line of struggle for socialism.

Both these attitudes have influenced the working class movement in Wales. They are also at the root, I would suggest, of the dominant attitude in the movement in England, which is not so much hostile, as indifferent, and lacking appreciation of the national question as a matter of any serious, practical significance. The Welsh movement itself must bear a big share of responsibility for the general attitude in the British working class organisations, which they have done too little to challenge, and this may be true of Scotland also.

A Parliament for Scotland, or for Wales, is a democratic reform which could be won by a widespread struggle under capitalism. Whether it is won, or whether it is in fact carried out after the achievement of socialism in Britain, depends on the vigour and course of the struggle. But to think that the fight for it would hinder or divert from the united movement for economic and social demands, or from the ultimate aim of socialism, is a political mistake.

The danger of such splitting and division will only grow if the Communists and other sections of the working class movement neglect to lead on the national issues and thus leave them in the hands of elements whose political basis is petty-bourgeois and non-socialist. This is a danger today.

Ignoring the national question will not cause it to disappear. The results would be the growth of a non-socialist nationalist movement, fed by the genuine grievances of people and their protest against the policy and bureaucracy of the right wing, and corroding the basic class loyalty of the Labour movement. It would make possible splits in the Trade Unions on national lines, and a real weakening of the common struggle. In addition it would mean the nationalist movement itself being ineffective, since any real advance in democratic self-government for the people of Wales or Scotland will have to be wrested from the entrenched power of the British capitalist class. The core of any such effective challenge must be the united strength of the working class.

If the working class holds back from playing its full part it will only leave the greater opportunity for the ruling class to play its own political game introducing at any stage such phoney reforms and "solutions of the national problem" as will best split the Labour movement and delay progress. The development of Nationalist movements in isolation from, and in antagonism to, the working class movement would suit the Establishment book very well.

Of course it is an illusion to think that the achievement of a Parliament for Wales (or Scotland) would of itself solve any of the economic or social problems of that country. That would depend on the political forces in the Parliament, their policies and the mass fight for them.

But it would be an important new stage in rallying the widest progressive alliance against the monopolies, focusing attention on the basic problems of Wales (or Scotland) and exposing the real vested interests that stand in the way of solving them. The form in which self-government is achieved, and the extent to which the fight for it helps forward understanding of the deeper social changes needed, depends upon the participation and leadership shown by the working class in the national movement now.

This is all the more so because the main issues of struggle in the British working class movement as a whole, are those of most immediate concern to the national future of Scotland and Wales. It is vital for them that the policies of economic restriction, the wage freeze, credit squeeze and Selective Employment Tax should be scrapped. They need more than any area the end of imperialist commitments and the arms burden. They need new programmes of modernisation and expansion. They need a massive injection of investment in social services. As an emergency step they need Government action to halt the economic run-down—a real ban for at least twelve months on pit, railway, or factory closures; no sackings without alternative work in the area; a crash programme to reduce unemployment.

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Scottish and Welsh Parliaments

But the common struggle for these demands should not overshadow, but rather reinforce the urgency of establishing Welsh and Scottish Parliaments without further delay. This accounts for the widespread anger when the Government White Paper on Local Government for Wales rejected the principle of an elected Council at national level in favour of the worn-out device of an appointed body. It is sometimes felt that the chief function of a Parliament would be to symbolise and express the spiritual and cultural unity of the nation. The importance of this is not in question. But it seems less clearly understood how essential such a Parliament now is to provide the popular driving force, and democratic control for the planned economic development of our countries.

Such Parliaments should be (in our view) single chamber assemblies, elected directly by proportional representation. They must have adequate powers and a financial basis to enable them to develop the all-round life of their countries with sufficient initiative and independence.

They would require powers to deal with Welsh and Scottish affairs in the fields of trade, industry, agriculture, location of industry, fuel and power, industrial legislation, land, fisheries, forestry, water, transport by land, sea and air, housing and town-planning, education, health, food, social insurance and social security, radio and television, and scientific industrial research. They would need administrative apparatus comprising Ministries and departments accordingly. An Executive body or Cabinet of Ministers would be responsible to the Welsh (or Scottish) Parliament.

In order to tackle the creation of viable economies which would be a sound basis of healthy community life in all parts of their countries, these Parliaments must have the machinery and powers for co-ordinated planning and control. Our approach must therefore involve an extension of public ownership, the establishment of Boards or Authorities for the control of all major industries on an All-Wales or All-Scotland basis, and responsible to the Parliament, which would plan for each country as an integrated economic unit. This of course does not cut across the closest co-operation for technical efficiency, between such Industrial Authorities and their neighbouring bodies in England. But it would ensure that the basic needs of All-Wales (or Scotland) development were not swept aside by the tests of immediate profitability and supposed inevitable growth points.

There is not space here to discuss the wide-ranging cultural questions which play such a vital part in the survival of a living national consciousness. The danger exists of genuine attempts to preserve cultural expression in national forms becoming artificial minority cults, while their basis in the everyday life of the people is being eroded. National democratic assemblies (Parliaments) and an economic revival are essential if our characteristic cultures are to survive in life and not simply in the museum.

The Welsh Language

The fight to keep the Welsh language alive and developing must have our full support. The principle of the equal validity of the Welsh and English languages should be made effective through the necessary facilities being available for all official and public purposes. Our aim is the creation of a bi-lingual nation; any extension of the legal status of the language that will help this is valuable, as are many educational and cultural measures that cannot be detailed here.

But the survival of the language and all it signifies for our living culture depends finally upon its use as an everyday, modern form of speech. To save the language we must stop depopulation of the most Welsh-speaking areas, maintain flourishing communities, where the language is spoken by young people with jobs and a future there.

No one can seriously examine the prospects of the Welsh language without realising that its greatest (and perhaps its ultimate) guarantee of survival lies in the early achievement of a socialist Britain. The

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remarkable expansion of scores of minority cultures in the Soviet Union must make every Welshman look to the day when the wealth of our society will also be devoted to the cultural enrichment of the whole people, rather than the commercial profit of a few.

Our Fight is Now

The most important question of course, is not to sketch detailed paper plans for self-government, but to mount the most powerful campaign throughout Britain to win support for the principle, and to force the Government to act. For the Labour Government within a few weeks to block the Hoosen "Government for Wales" Bill, and then deliberately refuse even the limited step of an Elected Council for Wales, is unjust to Wales and politically stupid (as many anxious Labour MPs and candidates will testify). But it also shows the stubborn reactionary opposition that has to be overcome before these major instalments of national justice and democratic reform will be won.

It is the duty of Communists and of the Labour Movement generally in Britain to lead this fight now. If the power of the Socialist and Trade Union movement of Britain is really exerted to force the Government to bring out proposals for Scottish and Welsh Parliaments, then there will be the most fruitful relationship between the national movement and the entire cause of progress and socialism. No one needs to underestimate the work to be done to win our own movement for the urgency as well as the justice of this issue. All the more should we be campaigning now from the branch rooms upwards.

In Wales and Scotland the whole-hearted co-operation of the Labour and Trade Union movement will open the way to the widest possible alliance of all organisations and people agreed on the aim of winning a Parliament for Wales (and Scotland) now. Certainly for Communists and all those on the Left there can be no other course than to fight with vigour for the organised working class to develop its policy and action to the full on every national issue. In both countries the strength and political experience of the working class can itself be reinvigorated by joining in a positive and popular national struggle.

In the movement itself there is a need for more democratically functioning Labour and Trade Union bodies at an All-Scotland or All-Wales level. Outstanding is the need for a Welsh Trades Union Congress, within the British TUC, to bring the Welsh Trade Unions together in the fight for militant policies and basic Welsh interests.

A National Movement and the Nationalist Parties

Conditions are fast developing for Wales and Scotland to win those measures of self-government which have long seemed remote or impracticable. What is required above all is the united action of the whole people of Scotland and Wales, expressed in broad, all-embracing national movements. Such a movement would combine the efforts of all sections of the people, of social, religious and trade union bodies, and all political parties who share the common aim of securing a Welsh (or Scottish) Parliament now. Communist, Labour, Welsh Nationalist and others could join in campaigning for the development of a broad alliance through joint activity on many matters of national interest which they all support.

Co-operation for these common aims would speed up their achievement without in any way preventing the various parties expressing their own policies, arguing their differences and fighting their own elections as they chose. The development of the Nationalist Parties, certainly, presents a mixture of features, some of which any socialist would feel bound to criticise, while prepared to accept others.

The Welsh Nationalist Party (Plaid Cymru) for example often presents itself as the only political expression of the entire national movement which of course it is far from being. Neither is it basically a socialist or working class party. Its present political role, while raising national consciousness, is directed strongly against the Labour Party and for the separation of Welsh workers from all "London dominated" organisations, including the British Trade Unions. Thus, instead of using its energies, enthusiasm and often acute criticism of the economic evils afflicting Wales, to rouse the Labour Movement in Wales and in England, in support of the demand for self-government, it takes up a position of isolation and separatism. This springs from the false analysis that all Welsh problems are due to exploitation of Wales by England, rather than exploitation of both by capitalism. It leads them to foster anti-English feelings and rivalries even amongst workers in the same industries. In their social programme, alongside many progressive proposals, there is a confusion of attacks on "big trade unions and state socialism" as well as on "English big capitalists".

It would be no service to Wales (and much the same must be true in Scotland) if we failed to carry out a firm and principled criticism of the illusions and dangers which some of these ideas could spread. Anti-socialism and trends towards splitting the working class movement on the basis of fomenting national prejudice must obviously be combated. They often arouse hostility to genuine national demands because of the misconceptions they create.

It is no use blinding ourselves to these problems on which we could not agree with Nationalist policy or argument. It is equally useless to hide the fact that some of the problems arise from the neglect of national issues by the Labour Movement. Big

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political changes are taking place, and the Nationalist Parties are changing also. A wide body of the most sincere supporters of national aspirations vote for their candidates. Amongst them are some of the best sections of our young people, and a great many of them have strong socialist and communist convictions as well.

The most friendly discussion and co-operation on agreed issues with such people can only help forward the genuine national interests of Wales and of the socialist movement. Reactionary trends, and extremist, even semi-fascist fringes there undoubtedly are. But to see the danger and ignore the vastly greater opportunity of the serious quest for a new way forward would be more than foolish.

The heart and core of any great people's movement in Wales or Scotland must be the working class and its organisations. To the extent that they champion the cause of Welsh and Scottish Parliaments now, they can ensure its success and strengthen the unity of the British working class in their fundamental struggle against monopoly capitalism.

Discussion Contribution on:

The Future of British Transport

Phil Goodwin

THE changes in emphasis in John Hostettler's article in May's *Marxism Today* from the earlier articles in the *Morning Star* and *Comment* are very much to be welcomed. Specifically, an acceptance that potential mass ownership of motor-cars does not necessarily imply social justification of a car-oriented transport system is of profound importance in developing an urban transport policy.

Even so, I believe that the perspective as outlined is not sufficiently analytical—is itself, in fact, an example of Hostettler's very true description of how proximity to traffic problems may obscure the best way to their solution. We still cannot see the road for the cars. What I would like to do is to discuss a number of the detailed arguments put forward, to attempt a critique of the *basis* of the study and to advance, at this stage very tentatively, an alternative way of solving the problem.

But first a very brief digression.

The Criteria for a Policy

As the Communist Party more and more realises its responsibility not only to advance a general strategy for Socialism, but also to put forward specific solutions to specific problems—in some considerable detail—it is necessary to work out criteria for judging our policies. These criteria I would say should be three:

(1) The policy should both be consistent in itself and consistent with the rest of our policies. One would avoid, for example, utilising £1,500 million in increased social service expenditure from a £1,000 million cut in the defence budget. The policy also should be sensible, in that it actually should be capable of solving the problems it describes. This is elementary, and without it our policies have no credibility to the public, the "experts" or ourselves.

(2) The policy should be socialist in outlook and basis. That is to say, it should be based on humanitarian and democratic principles, a commitment to the right of working people to the best life possible in any particular circumstances or social system, and the reduction of the power of anti-progressive forces, whether economic, political or social.

(3) The policy should have what might be called a "mobilisation factor"—popularity, in the true sense of the word. It must be possible to present it in such a way as to stimulate the degree of mass mobilisation necessary to ensure its implementation. This is vital for two reasons; without it, the policy stands condemned to spend its (probably very short) life confined to the paper on which it is written, and also without such a mobilisation there can be no *continuing* process of social advance, to take us from specific policies to a general social transformation.

With these factors—consistency, socialist outlook and popularity—in mind, a closer look can be taken of John Hostettler's article.

There are two minor technical flaws and three major inconsistencies in the analysis.

Saturation

"The sheer volume of traffic has virtually reached saturation point in many places", says the article.

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Related to traffic *flow* this is probably true; there is a "reserve capacity" of about 20 per cent on Central London roads and intersections during working hours, but little or no reserve during the evening peak.[1] But to say "statistically, saturation point is said to be about 530 vehicles per thousand persons" is quite unacceptable. This is the saturation of *ownership* of cars, not their use on urban roads. The fact that these are not identical is important in the creation of a "reservoir" of private cars, which I will come to shortly.

Vehicles per Mile of Road

While popularly used as a measure of traffic "density", vehicles per mile is in fact very misleading, even as an approximation of traffic needs. For example, with car ownership in America about double, and vehicles per road mile about half, that of Britain, to get the same vehicle per mile ratio while assuming the same car ownership saturation point would involve in the foreseeable future *quadrupling the existing total road mileage* in Britain. No one would, of course, put forward such a proposal.

Now we come to rather more serious criticisms.

Basis of Transport Plans

One major defect that has bedevilled the whole development of transport planning is its fundamental methodology; a plan is produced *on the basis of a prediction* about future car ownership and use, with the aim of providing roads and facilities to cope with the prediction, not materially to alter it. This is as true of Buchanan as of the London Traffic Survey and many municipal traffic plans.[2]

I do not believe that an answer to traffic problems will be found without a frontal attack on this method. And I do not believe that, even though Hostettler quite rightly accepts and extends Buchanan's "some degree of reliance upon mass transport" that his solutions provide this attack. It is fair to say that Hostettler's plan is designed to (and, to a certain extent, would) effect a degree of car-to-bus transfer in rush hours in cities, but it would (a) leave a sizeable number of people using cars at those times and (b) encourage an ever-increasing number of people to use cars at all other times. Now this is all very well, but provides an example of how, having failed to challenge the fundamental inconsistency, the argument is led inexorably into further difficulties.

There are now two parallel and conflicting lines of policy in the argument—public versus private transport in effect.

Car-to-Bus Transfer

The need for a car-to-bus transfer is accepted in the article. It is the use of cars for rush-hour urban journeys that, more than anything else, causes congestion; three cars, with an average of 1.5 passengers each, have the same effect on traffic flow as one bus, carrying in the evening peak an average of twenty-five people. London Transport is well aware of this, and provides a very dramatic presentation of its effects in the much quoted figures from 1955 to 1965:

> "28,800 additional cars, carrying 38,700 extra people, occupied more than five times the amount of road space made vacant by the 1,900 fewer buses. Though buses represented less than a sixth of the 1965 volume of traffic, they carried 60 per cent of the passengers, while private cars, which carried only a third of the passengers, accounted for nearly 80 per cent of the traffic volume."

Note that the number carried in buses still outweighed those in cars by nearly two to one; we should not over-estimate the political hegemony of the motorist.

This means that cars do not have to provide a majority of journeys to dominate and determine the conditions of traffic—far from it. Thus it might be expected that quite a large number of people would have to be attracted from cars to buses to effect significant traffic improvements; one estimate is that if *all* journeys were by bus, average traffic speed would increase by 24 per cent (46 per cent in the evening peak).[3]

Thus the first point at issue here is how extensive a realignment of public and private traffic is necessary to enable overall traffic conditions to improve significantly. The article ignores this.

The second point is how actually to effect the car-to-bus transfer. I am not familiar with the quoted estimate that a standard public transport fare of 1s. 0d. would reduce car journeys to the

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[1] Smeed & Wardrop; Institute of Transport Journal 1964.

[2] An interesting account of how this has affected America is contained in *Journal Of Industrial Economics* 1964-5. E. M. Hoover points out that this "allocation by consumer demand" leads to only one final outcome —the "completely auto-oriented quasi-metropolis". He quotes a very approximate result for Washington that "each additional vehicle entering the down-town area in the rush hour requires additional investment in street and parking space of about £5,000"—an incongruity comparable in scale to quadrupling British Road mileage.

[3] Smeed & Wardrop, op. cit. These sorts of figures are, of course, very tentative and not proved in practice.

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centre of London by 40 per cent, but there are other—possibly equally tentative—studies indicating that motorists have quite a high resistance to price changes; in fact the London Traffic Survey implied that quality of service was likely to be a more powerful factor. Estimates of the effect of systems of road pricing indicate that with a base speed of 10.7 mph, a flat rate parking charge of 6s. 0d. per vehicle (independently of how long parked) might discourage only 7 per cent of peak-hour traffic.[4]

The alternative roadpricing plan—direct charging by some sort of meter fixed to the car—is that based on the principle that "The road user should pay a sum equal to the costs he imposes on others", which has been estimated at 4.6d. per vehicle mile at 20 mph, 3s. 5d. per mile at 10 mph and the colossal 17s. 8d. per mile at 5 mph. This sort of policy, estimates the Road Research Laboratory, would deter about 5 per cent to 8 per cent of total car passenger mileage.

Of course, response of motorists to *upward* changes in the cost of motoring is not necessarily identical to the response to downward changes in the cost of alternative transport, but the figures indicate that it would be foolhardy to base a transport policy on these cost changes if the policy is such that a large-scale car-to-bus transfer is a central point. It is also worth noting that, unfortunately, motorists' resistance to price changes is higher at peak hours than off-peak hours—i.e. the method tends to solve the problem at times that it does not exist, but not when it is at its most severe. The *optimum* results of a road pricing policy estimated the Smeed Report, would be a saving of perhaps £100 million to £150 million of the total congestion costs of over £1,000 million, about 10 per cent.

Road Building

The inevitable consequence of a plan based on the continued, probably growing, existence of the private car in urban areas[5] is a vast expenditure on urban roads. Hostettler accepts this:

> "substantial physical changes will be necessary and will have to be paid for . . . the capital investment spent on motor vehicles is out of all proportion to that spent on roads . . . the large increase in the number of vehicles each year provides ever larger tax revenues that could help offset the cost of large-scale works".

Here Hostettler is by implication accepting some sort of direct or indirect road pricing scheme, yet an interesting point arises; this source of funds is only available if there is *not* a successful car to bus transfer policy. Similarly, using parking fees to subsidise public transport is only successful as long as these parking fees do not discourage private cars.

But there is a far more important difficulty here—perhaps the most important in the whole subject—arising from three factors;

(a) For any existing level of traffic, for any *individual* traveller, a car is quicker and more convenient than a bus.

(b) Once a person has made the large financial outlay for a car, additional running costs are fairly cheap, so that it is only slightly more expensive to run a car than to keep it unused.

(c) What is deterring many present car-owners from using their cars is the level of existing congestion, caused basically by other cars.

This means that there is a very large reservoir of potential car users who will *immediately* react to road improvements by driving their cars. Now it has been estimated[6] that if this additional traffic generated by a road improvement—say a modern, well-planned urban motorway—is only 20 per cent to 30 per cent of the original traffic level, all the time savings, cost savings, etc., originally justifying the building of the road, will be annulled. Whether or not there is a bottomless source of funds for financing such improvements, what is the *point* of wasting people's money this way? And yet "More Roads" is the only position that the frustrated car-owner can conceive of as the solution, however temporary, to the problem.

We have to face up to this. If a policy is going to attract a motorist, it must offer him something apart from a self-defeating and very expensive programme. The logic of Hostettler's article is that we should support road pricing yet this will without a doubt be, rightly or wrongly, as great a source of discontent among drivers as any policy yet implemented—and will probably confirm the Conservative Party's position as the champion of the motorists' interests. We cannot oppose it *and* call for a vast expansion of road building.

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[4] *Road Pricing on Urban Roads*. HMSO, 1964. This is assuming a peak period "elasticity" (i.e. the rate at which demand for road space is effected by price changes) of ½. Not nearly enough quantitative work has been done on measuring elasticity of demand in this field, but the figure is not likely to be higher. At this rate a charge of 15s. 0d. per vehicle would only deter one-quarter of the traffic.

[5] Even with some sort of "moderately restrictive policy"—a most tenuous concept but one which J. C. Tanner estimated might deter some 4 per cent to 6 per cent of car ownership over the next 15 years. Roads and Road Construction November-December 1965.

[6] Beesley, Blackburn and Foster. *Economica*, 1963.

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Buchanan

The trouble is that in our society the existence of generally progressive, reasonably sensible Reports and Plans welcomed with fanfares and subsequently relegated to a Whitehall pigeonhole is all too familiar—so much so that we have become used to having to fight for the implementation of such reports as the *first steps* towards a real solution. This, I think, is why progressives have placed far more attention than the Buchanan Report itself was prepared to do on the one paragraph concerning the provision of "good, cheap public transport". But this is one of the few prescriptive paragraphs that is nowhere in the text backed up with facts, figures and detailed proposals. The whole general tenor of the report is the opposite, and leads quite naturally not to a greater emphasis on public transport, but to plans of "city-cars", overhead motorways and the rest of it.

The Alternatives

It seems to me that the only *workable* alternative to the basically car-oriented urban transport system is the basically public-oriented one, and that attempts to combine the two are limited by the very nature of the problem; a 10 per cent or 20 per cent initial reduction in the level of private cars will not leave the buses significantly more able to provide a first-class service, and will, therefore, probably only be temporary anyway. This is why I believe that we should at least start examining the possibility of an urban transport system that is based on a *car-free* city centre, with free or very cheap public transport—subsidised, yes, but also with features that no amount of subsidy alone can give it, frequency, regularity and speed. Here is something to offer to car owners and non-car owners alike. It involves large-scale expenditure, but not as large as permanent growth of an urban motorway system.

I am not underestimating the difficulties—motorists will instinctively react against this, as against road pricing, but at least it can be explained as a sensible *solution* to the problem. Hostettler's way has two possibilities. First, it may not work at all, or at most only to such a limited extent that the vast expenditure involved is hardly justified. Second, if it does work there is a choice of criteria in deciding which are the lucky minority who can use their cars to commute to work; either it is "first come, first served", as implicit in a policy based on limitation of parking facilities, or it is the power of the purse, as in policies based on making car transport more expensive than bus transport. It is difficult to justify either in socialist terms.

All this should be put in perspective. There is no doubt that John Hostettler and his team have put in a lot of worth-while work in devising a detailed plan that, as it stands, is a good deal in advance of the policies officially adopted at present by any other political party, but substantial improvements have still to be made.

CORRECTION

In the Editorial Comment on "Two Anniversaries" (on pp. 290-291 in the October issue), the sentence starting "Sixteen years . . ." should read "Twenty years later, in 1887, the year of the publication of the English translation of the first volume, the TUC at Swansea had 156 delegates representing 131 unions with 674,034 members."

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